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Abstract
In this study we use cross-country bilateral data to quantify a two-
step process of international migration and its aggregate determinants.
We first analyze which country-specific factors aﬀect the probability
that individuals join the pool of potential (aspiring) migrants. Then
we consider the bilateral and destination country factors that aﬀect
the frequency at which potential migrants turn into actual migrants.
Using information on potential migrants from World Gallup surveys
and on actual migrants from national censuses for 138 origin coun-
tries and 30 major destinations between 2000 and 2010, we analyze
economic, policy, cultural and network determinants of each step. We
find that the size of the network of previous migrants and the average
income per person at destination are crucial determinants of the size
of the pool of potential migrants. Economic growth in the destination
country, on the other hand, is the main economic generator of migra-
tion opportunities for a given pool of potential migrants. We also find
that college educated exhibit greater actual emigration rates mainly
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because of better chances in realizing their immigration potentials,
rather than because of higher willingness to migrate.
Keywords: Potential Migrants, Migration Aspirations, Migration Op-
portunities, College Educated, Migration Policies, Economic factors.
Article Classification: Research paper
INTRODUCTION
Migrating from a country of origin to a country of destination involves sev-
eral steps, not all of them observable and measurable (Paul, 2011). This
paper relates to the existing literature by considering the migration process
as comprised of two main steps. We first analyze the macro-determinants of
the aggregate probabilities of becoming potential migrants (first-step) and
then we look at the factors determining what fraction of potential become
actual (second-step) migrants. A tradition in the migration literature iden-
tifies a clear first step in the decision of looking for migration opportunities.
"Aspiring" migrants are those who express an intention/desire to emigrate
(Becerra, 2012; Carling, 2002; Creighton, 2013, van Dalen et al., 2005a, van
Dalen et al. 2005b, Jónsson, 2008). Several studies have used survey ques-
tions to elicit this information and have thoroughly analyzed specific cases,
often focused on one country of origin or one migration corridor, such as
Mexico-US. These studies have been focused on uncovering detailed motiva-
tions of potential migrants and on individual level analysis, but are hard to
compare with each other or across countries and to generalize into quantifi-
able tendencies.
From an economist’s perspective, deciding to be in the pool of potential
migrants is explained as a rational decision. Individuals evaluate how desir-
able it would be to migrate to a foreign country relative to staying in the
country of origin. An implicit comparison of the utility (benefits minus costs)
of staying with the utility of migrating to diﬀerent potential countries is made
by individuals. "Potential" migrants are those who state a preference for mi-
grating (arguably because perceived benefits of migrating are larger than
perceived costs). Those benefits and costs depend on the presence of family
members abroad, on individual characteristics and on economic and social
conditions, among other things. Hence, a large part of the sociological litera-
ture, relating those factors to the intention of migrating (both by individuals
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and families), can be interpreted in this framework (e.g. Papapanagos and
Sanfey, 2001; Wood et al., 2010; Yang, 2000).
The second step of the migration process takes place when some searchers
in the pool of potential migrants find opportunities to migrate — such as
a job oﬀer, a temporary visa, a study opportunity or a family permit —
and migrate. The interactions between potential migrants and migration
opportunities determine the flow of actual migrants (Carling, 2002). From an
economic perspective it can be considered as somewhat similar to a matching
process: Heterogeneous individuals who are willing to migrate find — through
a slow and costly process — potential migration opportunities. Pissarides
(2000) popularized the use of search and matching in labor market studies.
Some of the underlying features of those models can be used in the analysis of
how potential migrants (searchers) and migration opportunities are matched
and produce the flow of actual migrants.
In the present study we implement a simple two-stage empirical analysis
to illustrate the role of aggregate determinants of migration flows. First,
we analyze empirically what country-specific and bilateral factors determine
the size (and composition between education groups) of the pool of potential
migrants. The latter is defined as those who have revealed being willing to
migrate by positively answering the question “Ideally, if you had the oppor-
tunity, would you like to move permanently or temporarily to another coun-
try, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?”. Most of them
have, then, indicated a preferred country in the follow-up question “To which
country would you like to move?”. In the second step we analyze how these
potential migrants combine with factors determining migration opportunities
and generate actual migration flows.
The answers to the questions described above were obtained from rep-
resentative Gallup polls (described in detail in Gallup, 2012) and available
for 138 countries — representing 97 percent of the world population — be-
tween 2007 and 2013. After organizing, cleaning and aggregating these data
by origin-destination pairs, we merged them with data on actual bilateral
net migration flows for the 2000-2010 period from 138 countries to 30 major
migrant-receiving countries. Bilateral net migrations are measured as the
diﬀerence in the stock of migrants from an origin to a specific destination
between 2000 and 2010. Hence, they are good estimates of the long-term
flows of permanent migrants. Dividing by native population in the country
of origin we construct net migration rates and potential migration rates be-
tween country pairs over the 2000-2010 decade. With these bilateral data
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we analyze in a simple econometric framework how the pool of potential mi-
grants and migration opportunities (stemming among others from economic
growth, policies in the receiving country, the presence of networks) deter-
mine the net migration rates. In doing so we learn (i) which factors aﬀect
migration by changing the share of potential migrants in the population and
(ii) which factors aﬀect the actual migration rate, given the pool of potential
migrants.
Throughout our analysis, we distinguish between individuals with at least
some college education (that we call college-educated) and those without
(sometimes called "less educated" or non-college educated)[1]. Their increas-
ingly diﬀerent labor market performance in most developed countries (Autor
et al., 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2008; Moretti, 2012), and - even more impor-
tantly - their diﬀerent degree of national and international mobility (Grogger
and Hanson, 2011; Artuç et al., forthcoming), call for a separate analysis to
better understand their diﬀerences. Are college educated individuals more
mobile because they are more likely to be potential migrants in response to
perceived economic opportunities? Or are they more mobile because within
the pool of potential migrants, they have a greater probability of finding
opportunities? As most receiving countries’ immigration policies, either di-
rectly or covertly, favor highly educated immigrants, diﬀerences in the rate
of realization of migration opportunities between college educated and non-
college educated are likely to depend on immigration policies. Alternatively,
college educated may be able to navigate through foreign labor markets more
easily and acquire knowledge of more opportunities.
Several interesting results emerge from our analysis. First, supporting
the cost-benefit model used as the basis of economic studies of migration,
we find that the average income at destination and the presence of networks
of previous migrants are robust and quantitatively significant determinants
of potential migration rates. Interestingly college educated and non-college
educated respond to destination income and networks in a broadly similar
way when it comes to willingness to migrate. On average, the less educated
are only somewhat less likely to be willing to migrate and their willingness
to migrate responds to economic incentives with similar elasticities as college
educated. Yet, college educated have a three to four times larger probabil-
ity of actually migrating, once in the pool of potential migrants. This is
the main factor determining skill-biased emigration. Third, growth in gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita in the receiving country is the only eco-
nomic factor that we find positively correlated with migration rates once we
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control for the pool of potential migrants, and such correlation is stronger for
non-college educated. Fourth, policies allowing free mobility of labor across
borders (such as within the European Union), which are the closest to having
open borders, had a small (and sometimes statistically insignificant) eﬀect in
translating potential into actual migrants among non-college educated. They
had no eﬀect on the mobility of college educated in 2000-2010. Similarly the
presence of visa-waiver agreement between countries has a positive but small
correlation with actual migration flows of the less educated, for given po-
tential. One has to keep in mind, however, that free migration policies only
exist between rather similar countries within Europe. Likewise, visa waiving
agreements exist between countries with similar levels of development and
democracy, mainly the rich Western countries (Neumayer, 2006). Finally, we
find that economic growth in the destination countries had a proportionally
stronger eﬀect on migration opportunities from sending countries where the
pool of potential migrants to that destination was larger. Networks in the
destination country, income diﬀerentials and geographical and cultural prox-
imity had only a minor impact on migration rates once we control for the
pool of potential searchers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the ex-
isting literature on the determinants of migration, focusing on the empirical
aggregate approach we use that derives from the economics literature. In the
following section, we present the data on potential and on actual migrants
and show some descriptive statistics and general trends. Subsequently, we
provide the framework for the empirical analysis. In the empirical section,
we first estimate the impact of economic characteristics, policy variables and
network size on the pool of searchers, among college and non-college edu-
cated. Subsequently, we analyze how the pool of potential migrants and
receiving-country opportunities determine actual migration rates of college
and non-college educated. We end with a brief summary and some conclu-
sions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The classical way economists look at migration has been by founding the
decision to migrate in an individual cost-benefit analysis (utility maximiza-
tion). By aggregating heterogeneous individuals this framework has allowed
scholars to analyze the determinants of aggregate migration flows and the
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selection of migrants (along the skill dimension). Examples of this approach
can be found in Borjas (1987), Clark et al. (2007), Grogger and Hanson
(2011), Hatton (2005), Roy (1951) and Sjastaad (1962). In this paper, we
use this aggregate empirical perspective based on an individual cost-benefit
analysis. However we incorporate it in a two-step process by analyzing first
the aspiration and then the realization of migration potentials in sequence.
This approach draws inspiration from a framework that has long been ap-
plied in other social sciences. As mentioned in the introduction, several
studies (e.g. Becerra, 2012; Carling, 2002; Creighton, 2013; Czaika, M. and
Vothknecht, 2014; De Jong, 2000; Hagen-Zanker et al. 2009; van Dalen et al.,
2005) have recognized the importance of analyzing the factors influencing the
aspiration to migrate in specific countries and contexts. Some of these stud-
ies have explicitly taken a two-step approach, analyzing (i) aspirations and
(ii) ability to migrate (Carling, 2002). Our analysis extends this approach
by drawing upon additional economic theory and using a uniquely extensive
dataset. Our two-step analysis is loosely based on utility maximization in the
first step and “matching” of potential migrants and migration opportunities
in the second.
Empirically, the specifications we use to analyze the “first step” are sim-
ilar to the bilateral gravity-like regressions grounded on theoretical micro-
foundations and used in several previous studies (e.g. Karemera et al., 2000;
Hatton and Williamson, 2005; Clark et al., 2007; Bahna, 2008; Hooghe et
al., 2008; Pedersen et al., 2008; Mayda, 2010; Ruyssen et al., 2014). Several
recent papers have refined the economic analysis of the determinants of mi-
gration, framing the empirical estimates within a more rigorous multi-country
choice, random utility maximization model derived from McFadden (1974).
Grogger and Hanson (2011), Beine et al. (2011) and Ortega and Peri (2013),
for instance, analyze bilateral migration as the result of a multinomial choice
among alternative locations, driven by utility maximization determined by a
comparison of costs and benefits. They relate the migrant/non-migrant ra-
tios to economic and policy factors. Recently, Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas
(2013) extended this framework to more general decision structures and im-
plemented more complex, yet more general, econometric analyses. More
generally, Beine et al. (forthcoming) discuss the methodological challenges
that are implied by the use of bilateral data for the analysis of international
migration. These papers are closely related to ours in that they also use
aggregate bilateral cross-country data to identify determinants of migration
flows.
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In the first step we analyze the role of several factors that previous re-
searchers have found to be important in aﬀecting costs and benefits of mi-
gration. First of all income and job availability at destination, but also geo-
graphical, cultural and institutional distance and social linkages (networks)
between countries. Fawcett (1989), Bauer and Zimmerman (1997), Hooghe
et al. (2008), Pedersen et al. (2008), Mayda (2010), Beine et al. (2011) and
Ruyssen et al. (2014) are examples analyzing the impact of some of these
factors directly on migration. Diﬀerently from these studies, however, we
first focus on the impact of those factors on potential (rather than actual)
migration.
The second part of our analysis looks at the process of combining po-
tential migrants with factors that produce migration opportunities. In this
respect, the combination of potential migrants and potential opportunities in
receiving countries can be described in the context of a "matching" function
(as in Pissarides and Petrongolo, 2001; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2006; or
Gregg and Petrongolo, 2005 among others) that summarizes the slow and
uncertain process through which potential migrants realize migration oppor-
tunities. This is a somewhat new way of looking at the second stage of the
migration process in which potential migrants become actual migrants. By
including policy, cultural, geographical and other determinants of the likeli-
hood of migration among potential migrants, we want to identify all factors
(economic and not) that aﬀect the probability that a potential migrant turns
into an actual migrant.
There is a small but growing literature analyzing migration opportunities
in a search and matching framework. Chassamboulli and Peri (2014), for in-
stance, used such a framework to investigate the eﬀect of the US immigration
policy on illegal immigration fromMexico. Ortega (2000), on the other hand,
theoretically showed that multiplicity of equilibria can arise from the interac-
tion of searching firms’ and migrants’ optimizing behavior due to search and
job creation externalities. Whereas those are search and matching models
of migration for labor reasons, this paper uses the matching framework in a
broader sense. In particular, we use bilateral data to statistically describe
the process of matching potential migrants with “migration opportunities”.
It is worth noticing that we do not directly observe “migration opportuni-
ties” (namely the number of jobs, permits or visas available to foreigners) in
receiving countries. We can identify, however, some receiving-country factors
(such as productivity growth and policies) that could aﬀect the availability
of those opportunities and the probability of matching them with potential
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migrants.
As the Gallup data on willingness to migrate are new, the literature
relying on these data to capture potential migration is very limited. There
are several studies analyzing the willingness (aspiration) to migrate using
country specific surveys—for instance in Mexico (Becerra, 2012; Becerra et
al. 2010; Creighton, 2013), in Cape Verde (Carling, 2002), in North Africa
(van Dalen 2005) and in China (Yang, 2000), just to cite a few. The fact
that our database, on the other hand, covers all countries in the world makes
it exceptional. A recent report by the International Migration Organization
(Esipova et al., 2011) presents detailed descriptive statistics on the willingness
to migrate across countries based on these data. A very recent working paper
by Manchin et al. (2014), in addition, analyzes the importance of individual
satisfaction on the desire to migrate using individual data from the same
Gallup Poll, disregarding the bilateral dimension.
DATA ONMIGRATION ANDWILLINGNESS TOMIGRATE
Our database includes 138 countries of origin for which data on both actual
and desired emigration are available towards 30 major destination countries
[2]. The set of destinations includes all major OECD countries as well as
Persian Gulf countries, the Russian Federation and South Africa. According
to the United Nations database, our set of destination countries accounts for
66.3 percent of the worldwide stock of international migrants in 2010 (and
63.4 percent of the stock in 2000). Throughout our analysis, we always sepa-
rate college-educated individuals (denoted as ) who attended some tertiary
education and less (or non-college-) educated individuals (denoted with )
who did not attend any tertiary education. These two groups are very dif-
ferent in terms of wage, job type and mobility. During the recent decades
their economic diﬀerences, especially in developed countries, have grown (see
Moretti, 2012, Autor et al., 2008). We compare statistics and findings for
the two groups. Our set of 30 destination countries accounted, respectively,
for 82.5 and 57.8 of the stock of highly and less educated adult migrants in
the year 2000.
We focus on bilateral migration flows over the period 2000-2010. The
actual migration rate from country of origin  to destination country  is
calculated as the net migration flow (obtained as the diﬀerence between the
2010 and the 2000 stocks of people born in  residing in country ), nor-
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malized by the native non-migrant population of country  in 2000. These
bilateral rates are denoted by  and  for college and non-college ed-
ucated, respectively. While net migration rates over 10 years imperfectly
capture short-term gross migration[3], they represent more closely the change
in permanent migrants. Moreover net measures of migration, as they are de-
rived from census data (rather than from registers of entry), are much more
reliable and include non-documented migrants in several countries.
We then define the “desired” (though unrealized) migration rate from
country  to country  as the share among native non-migrants in country ,
interviewed by the Gallup Poll between 2007 and 2013, who said that they
would be willing to migrate (permanently or temporarily) to country  if
they had an opportunity, but who are still in the country of origin. Whereas
most respondents indicated a specific country of desired migration, some
individuals only demonstrate a willingness to migrate but no specific desired
destination. We considered all those who indicated a preference for migrating
as “willing” and allocated those who did not express a country preference in
proportion of the preferences expressed by those who did.[4] We denote these
bilateral rates as  and  (for “willingness”), respectively for college and
non-college educated. The population of reference, encompassing all people
who could, in principle, migrate, is always the initial population of natives
in country  as of the year 2000, denoted by  and  , respectively, for
college and non-college educated. The rates  and  are both expressed
relative to this initial population of natives in 2000. The sum of those two
rates, therefore, gives the “potential” emigration rate. It combines those
who emigrated (between 2000-2010) and those who are willing to migrate
but were still in the country of origin by 2010. Hence, potential migration
rates are denoted by  =  +  and  =  + . To capture
some key characteristics of potential and actual migrants let us consider some
summary statistics and aggregate features of migration rates from the origin
and destination countries’ perspectives.
General overview
Table 1 shows the values for emigration rates of college educated and the less
educated (without college degree), averaging 138 countries of origin in the
upper part of the table. In the second row we show the actual net emigration
rate, and in the third row the “desired” emigration rate as defined above.
In the first row, for comparison, we show the stock of emigrants relative
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to the native population as of 2000. The first two columns of the table
show the values averaged across countries of origin, weighted by their native
population. The percentages correspond to those in the aggregate native
population. The third and fourth columns, on the other hand, show the
simple average rates counting each country as one, so that small countries
have the same weight as large countries in the summary statistics. The much
larger values in columns 3 and 4 are due to the fact that emigration rates
(both actual and desired) are larger in small countries.
 Table 1 about here 
Three interesting facts emerge from these aggregate statistics. Focusing
on the weighted figures, actual emigration rates between 2000 and 2010 as a
share of the world population were fairly small. Only 0.4 percentage points
of the native non-migrant population without college education migrated be-
tween 2000 and 2010, compared to 3.9 percentage points of those with college
education. Desired emigration rates were larger. About 8.5 percent of non-
college educated and 16.2 percent of college educated said that they were
willing to migrate (if they had an opportunity) but they did not do so in
the considered period. Most strikingly, there was a much larger diﬀerence
between non-college and college educated in actual rates (ratio of almost 10
to 1) than in desired rates (ratio of 1.9 to 1). This is even more notable when
we consider the simple averages in columns 3 and 4. This fact suggests that
the low migration rates of non-college educated may not be due to a diﬀer-
ence in perceived benefits/costs of migrating, but may rather be explained
by the fact that those searching for migration opportunities without a col-
lege degree have a much harder time finding them. An additional interesting
implication of the simple averages is that if all people who say that, ideally,
they are willing to migrate would do so, the migration rate of college edu-
cated would still exceed that of non-college educated, but emigration rates
of the two groups would be much closer. However we should be cautious
in considering the desired (potential) migration rate as realizable under any
circumstances. Our results below show that even free labor mobility policies
do not seem to move potential and actual migration rates any closer together.
While “potential migration” is an interesting concept to identify migration
searchers, the frictions and hurdles preventing its translation into actual mi-
gration could be pervasive and hard to reduce, at least within the plausible
range of policies and institutions.
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The lower part of Table 1 shows, instead, summary statistics on actual
and desired migration rates from the perspective of the receiving country.
The actual and desired flows (and stocks in 2000) of migrants are aggregated
by country of destination (or desired destination) and divided by the native
resident population of the destination country. Hence, those two rows show
actual and desired “immigration” rates for the 30 destinations considered,
averaged either by weighting by the destination country population (columns
1 and 2) or without weights (columns 3 and 4).
As stated above, the considered 30 destination countries receive about
two thirds of the actual, worldwide migration stock, and 82.5 percent of
the worldwide stock of high-skilled migrants. Yet, they include less than
20 percent of the world population so that the immigration rates for these
countries are much greater than the emigration rates for the origins in our
sample. During the 2000-2010 period, immigration of non-college educated
into the considered destination countries corresponded to 2.4 percent of their
aggregate non-college educated population as of 2000, compared to 6 percent
for college educated. Desired immigration among non-college educated, i.e.
the size of the inflow of all “willing” migrants, would amount to 42 percent
of the native non-college educated population. For college educated, desired
immigration equals 26 percent of the receiving country population. In this
case there are more potential non-college educated migrants to our destina-
tion countries than there are college educated. The reason is that, while the
emigration rate from almost any country is larger for college educated, there
are many more non-college educated in the sending than in the receiving
countries so that - from the destination point of view - the flow in percentage
of non-college educated would be much larger. Hence, if all people who are
willing to migrate would follow on their desire, the inflow of immigrants into
the considered receiving countries would be much less skill-intensive than
it is today. For most countries, it would still be college intensive but in
some countries (such as the US), the inflow would become much larger and
non-college intensive. Let us emphasize, before moving to the analysis of in-
dividual countries, that the data used to construct desired emigration rates,
only use the information about people’s willingness to migrate. On the other
hand those used to calculate desired immigration rates use also the infor-
mation on the most preferred country of migration. In as much as potential
migrants are willing to migrate to other (less preferred) countries, or do not
know exactly which country they would like to migrate to, there would be
significantly more imprecision in the second measure than in the first. Coun-
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tries that do not top the lists of most preferred but could still be desirable
destinations, in particular, could receive significantly more immigrants than
these figures suggest, if they unilaterally opened their borders.
Sending and receiving countries
Desired and hence potential migration rates are significantly larger than ac-
tual migration rates. Here we show preliminary evidence that they are also
correlated with those. Table 2 shows the actual net immigration rates and
the desired immigration rates — desired from the point of view of migrants —
for each of the 30 considered receiving countries. First, note that the actual
net immigration rate for non-college educated is usually below 10 percent and
sometimes quite small (or even negative in the presence of return migration).
In contrast, the immigration rate of college educated is found to be usually
quite large, on average it is 35.8 percent. The United Arab Emirates form a
clear outlier, attracting immigrants in much larger numbers than the native
population both among more and less educated. The labor force of profes-
sionals and workers in these countries has typically been built by attracting
immigrants. Australia, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, attracted a large inflow of college educated and had a very skill-
intensive immigration in the 2000-2010 period. These data confirm previous
studies (Docquier et al., 2014; Artuç et al., forthcoming) in finding that, for
essentially all migration receiving countries, the flow of recent immigrants
was college educated intensive relative to the native population. The third
column defines immigration as “skilled”(“unskilled”) if the net immigration
rate between 2000-2010 was larger for college (non-college) educated. All
but two countries in our sample (US and New Zealand) were characterized
by skilled immigration in the 2000s. The remaining columns calculate the
desired immigration rate for the same set of receiving countries 2000-2010.
While both rates are much larger than the actual ones, non-college educated
desired immigration is eight times as large as actual, while the ratio for col-
lege educated is less than three. As a result, while the majority of countries
would still be facing skilled desired immigration, ten countries would switch
to primarily low-skilled immigration if all those who are willing to migrate
were to do so leading to a much smaller over-representation of college edu-
cated among immigrants. The US exhibits desired immigration rates heavily
biased in favor of unskilled, mainly because it is the most popular migration
destination for most people in the world and because, on average, there are
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many more non-college educated than college educated in the world.
 Table 2 about here 
Preliminary evidence also shows high correlation between potential mi-
gration and actual emigration rates in Figures 1 and 2. These figures report
scatterplots of actual and potential emigration rates from the 138 sending
countries and the OLS regression lines describing their correlation separately
for non-college and college educated. By aggregating all destinations we are
reducing also the error in assigning potential migrants to one or another
destination. We observe a positive and very significant correlation for both
college and non-college educated. The regression line for the college educated,
however, has a slope of 0.93 and potential migration rates explain most of
the variation of actual rates (R2=0.969). For non-college educated, the slope
is only 0.24, though still very significant (R2=0.378). We can summarize this
stylized fact by saying that countries with a very large net emigration rate of
college educated are those where many college educated want to emigrate. To
the contrary, for less educated, the percentage of people willing to emigrate
is always much larger than (and less correlated to) the percentage of actual
migrants. This is a clear sign that desiring to emigrate is far less eﬀective in
realizing emigration for non-college educated than for college educated.
 Figure 1 about here 
 Figure 2 about here 
Figures 3 and 4 show similar scatterplots for immigration rates in the
30 destination countries. The scatterplots are more noisy implying that our
data about willingness to migrate to a specific country may be less precise
than in capturing a general willingness to migrate, as mentioned above. Nev-
ertheless, potential immigration rates have a significant and positive eﬀect
on actual immigration rates. Yet, for each increase in the potential immi-
gration rate of non-college educated by one percentage point of the native
population, only 0.05 percentage points of actual immigrants would materi-
alize. For each percentage point of potential college educated, instead, the
country would receive almost 0.2 percentage points of actual immigrants.
This diﬀerence between college and non-college in the percentages of poten-
tial migrants turning into actual migrants will prove to be a very pervasive
feature of international migration. It survives the inclusion of many controls,
it is present both in aggregate and bilateral rates and it is common to poor
and not so poor countries of origin.
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 Figure 3 about here 
 Figure 4 about here 
FRAMEWORK
As described above, we organize our data into aggregate groups by country of
origin , destination  and education categories:  (college educated), and 
(non-college, or less educated). The native population of reference is defined
as the total number of individuals aged 25 and over, born and residing in
country  in the year 2000, (the first year of our sample). We call these groups
 and   respectively for more and less educated. The desired migration
rates,  and  then capture those who revealed themselves as willing
to migrate to country  yet who were still residing in  between 2007 and
2013, expressed as shares of  and  . The net migration rates  and
 then equal the net flows of actual migrants from country  to country in the period 2000-2010, relative to the initial population in 2000. The
sum of these two groups constitutes the total of potential migrants, i.e.  
and  , which, standardized by the initial population, correspond to the
potential migration rates denoted by  and 
Potential migrants should have higher utility (accounting for migration
costs and gains) from living/working in country  than in their country of
birth . This is the group identified by migration scholars as “aspiring” or
“intended” migrants. Our main specification considers the revealed migra-
tion preference for a specific destination country . This may be a strong
assumption (De Jong, 2000, De Jong et al., 1996) which is relaxed when we
analyze the overall migration potential (rather than bilateral) by aggregat-
ing all potential migrants in a country of origin. Allowing for heterogeneity
in preferences across individuals, but assuming that all individuals (i) value
income from higher wages and higher probability of employment, and (ii)
incur higher costs when moving farther and to more diﬀerent countries, im-
plies that - after controlling for country of origin characteristics - the share
of people who would potentially migrate from  to  among all individuals,
, depends positively on the returns and negatively on the costs of mi-
grating from  to  (see Borjas, 1987; or Grogger and Hanson, 2011 for a
similar framework). So we assume that people account for all perceived costs
and benefits of migration when revealing whether they would like to migrate
or not and to which country. Also, the willingness to move to a country
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shows that individuals know about the opportunities in that country, and
therefore the availability of information about that country can be a crucial
determinant of willingness to move there. In general, we can write:
 = (  ) (1)
We then consider a linear approximation of (1) which expresses the po-
tential migration rate, , as a linear function of factors aﬀecting the re-
turns in a specific destination, the bilateral cost of migrating and the flow
of information from country .[5] Following the economic literature (as in
Borjas, 1987; Hatton, 2005; Mayda, 2010) we consider wages (approximated
by income per person) and employment opportunities (approximated by em-
ployment/population ratio) in country  as the main determinants of the
economic returns to migration. Following the economic and anthropological
literature (e.g. Putterman and Weil, 2010; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009)
we include measures of distance and proximity in geographic, language, ge-
netic and cultural space to capture migration costs. Finally we consider the
size of the destination country and the presence of a pre-existing diaspora
of migrants from country  as the main sources of information about the
country. The diaspora presence can also directly reduce migration costs by
providing easier assimilation. We can, therefore, write relation (1) as a linear
specification of the following form (for  =  ):
 = +12000+22000+3+4 ln+5+ (2)
In equation (2),  is a set of 138 country of origin dummies that cap-
ture heterogeneity of people and preferences and economic conditions across
origins. The term 2000 captures per capita income (GDP) in the destina-
tion country in PPP US $ as of the year 2000. The term 2000 is the ratio
of employment to population in working age as of 2000 in the destination
country. These variables proxy (imperfectly) for the expected income and
employment probability of a migrant and determine the economic attrac-
tiveness of a destination. Their cross-sectional diﬀerences are very large and
one can plausibly assume that individual decisions on long-term migration
are informed by these diﬀerences.  is a set of bilateral variables cap-
turing geographical distance, such as common border, language or colonial
origin and measures of genetic, religious and legal distance across countries.
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Those factors aﬀect the transferability of skills, cultural barriers and mov-
ing costs, hence influencing costs and benefits from migration. The term
ln captures the size of the receiving country which aﬀects its “visibil-
ity” to potential migrants. , finally, is a measure of the size of the
stock of existing migrants from  in  in 2000 expressed as percentage of
the population in the origin country. This is a first approximation of the
connection with the country of destination, which can aﬀect information and
reduce costs of settling and hence could aﬀect potential migration. The term
 captures measurement error.
Specification (2) is similar to what is usually estimated in the economic
literature using actual migration data (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Beine et
al. 2011; Ortega and Peri, 2013). Our data allows us to go one step further.
The actual migration “action” requires that “a migration opportunity” be-
comes available to potential migrants. This could be the opportunity of a visa
or a migration permit, or it may involve a study, working or career opportu-
nity. A successful migration episode, in other words, involves the matching
of a migration opportunity at destination  and a potential migrant from
country  from the pool . Hence, we express actual migration, , as
the number of successful potential migrant-opportunity matches, which de-
pends positively on the size of the population willing to migrate to , ,
and on the opportunities for migrants arising in the 2000-2010 period in the
destination country, . Those viable opportunities (hence the letter ) are
usually not specific to people in country  hence we only have a subscript 
but in practice some bilateral factors could improve the availability of those
opportunities to some specific countries of origin. In general we write:
 = (
+
 
+
) (3)
The superscript  permits diﬀerentiating between college and non-college
educated. This framework allows us to explore whether economic growth
(captured by real income per capita growth, 00−10 ) or employment growth
(captured by the growth of employment relative to the population, 00−10 )
in the period 2000-2010 in the destination countries contributed to actual
migration, once we account for the pool of potential migrants for that coun-
try. Fast growth of income per capita or growth of employment are driven by
productivity growth, which would increase demand for labor in a destination
country, creating opportunities (jobs, study, business) for immigrants. These
vacancies could be matched to potential migrants willing to move to that
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country. Potential migrants are a stock (share of those who would migrate)
measured at a specific point in time. This is why their size depends on a sta-
tic comparison of income per person, capturing long-run present discounted
values. Actual migrants, on the other hand, are a flow (the subset that realize
migration potential within a period). Hence, the creation of opportunities to
migrate which aﬀects the flow is correlated to GDP and employment growth
at destination. Such flows, however, may have a diﬀerent impact on sending
countries depending on the stock of potential migrants. New jobs and growth
of productivity are needed to produce new opportunities for an existing stock
of potential immigrants. We will test the premise that income levels (rather
than growth) aﬀect potential immigrants while income growth (rather than
levels) aﬀect net migration for given potential immigrants.
Potentially important in translating potential into actual migrants are
also the policies in the destination country. We analyze the role of some
specific policies (). In particular, we consider visa waiver policies
that regulate access to a country for all foreigners as well as free mobility of
labor which is the closest policy to open borders. It is worth noticing that
these two policy variables only aﬀect entry conditions and not the conditions
of stay in the destination countries (e.g. employment, taxation, etc.). Clearly
the details and nuances of immigration policies are large and very diﬀerent
across countries (for more sophisticated indices, see Ortega and Peri, 2013;
Helbling and Vink, 2013) and our simple indicators may not be capturing
important aspects of those policies. Finally, we can analyze whether the
pool of potential migrants and economic and policy variables interacted with
each other to increase the matching rate, and hence the realized migration
rate. Linearizing the matching function given in equation (3), including
country-of-origin fixed eﬀects  and substituting the potential determinants
of opportunities of migration, , we have:
 =  + 1 + 200−10 + 300−10 + 4 +  (4)
where  is the residual term.
While we consider economic growth and receiving-country policies as the
key determinants of migration opportunities for potential migrants in the em-
pirical analysis we will also include bilateral cost variables, network variables
and other economic variables as controls. In our empirical analysis we will
estimate the basic equations (2) and (4) in order to determine which factors
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aﬀect the size of the pool of potential migrants and which factors aﬀect their
matching with migration opportunities.
DETERMINANTS OF POTENTIAL MIGRATION RATES
We first estimate several versions of equation (2) to analyze the determinants
of potential migration rates, including a progressively larger set of determi-
nants and controls. The dependent variable is the potential emigration rate
for each skill group  from country  to country  in the period 2000-2010,
. As some values of the actual net emigration rate, , are negative
(due to return migration or migrants’ mortality), we set them to zero be-
fore calculating the potential rate and, similarly, we censor the observations
on bilateral migration at a value equal to the average plus five standard
deviations as some of them are relative to very small countries and hence
excessively noisy. Let us emphasize that, while customary in this literature,
the identification of causal eﬀects using a cross-section estimation has to
be taken with caution. While controlling for country of origin specific fac-
tors and for important bilateral factors, there are still unobserved bilateral
and destination-specific factors that may bias the coeﬃcients. While we will
sometimes use a causal language referring to the explanatory variables as
“determinants of potential migration” we are well aware that our estimates
mainly identify correlates of potential migration and migration flows.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the migration variables, net emi-
gration rates and potential emigration rates and for the stock of migrants,
divided by the native population and for the share of natives with at least
one member of the household who migrated abroad during the previous five
years[6]. The potential bilateral migration rate for non-college educated has
an unweighted average value equal to 0.49 percent, compared to 0.71 percent
for college educated[7]. The actual bilateral migration rate for non-college
educated was on average 0.05 percent, while for college educated the average
bilateral rate amounted to 0.21 percent. These rates are small but capture
bilateral (not aggregate) migration net flows (not stocks) of migrants. Each
country of origin has 30 destinations. Hence, average bilateral rates of 0.05
percent and 0.21 percent imply migration rates of 1.5 percent and 6 percent
of the native population in total over the 2000-2010 period.[8]
 Table 3 about here 
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Tables 4 and 5 display estimation results for non-college and college ed-
ucated, respectively. They show the coeﬃcients on economic, network and
policy variables in regressions whose dependent variable is the potential emi-
gration rate for the two skill groups separately. In each regression we include
a set of 138 countries of origin eﬀects to account for heterogeneity in char-
acteristics and conditions in the countries of origin. We also include the
logarithm of population at destination to account for the size of the desti-
nation country, which could aﬀect the potential to migrate there if people
are more likely to know of larger countries’ opportunities relative to smaller
ones. We also cluster the standard errors at the country of origin level to
allow residuals to be correlated among individuals in the same country of
origin. We progressively include more controls from column 1 to 6. In col-
umn 1 we only include the measures of migrant networks (i.e. the stock of
natives from country  residing in country  as of 2000, in percentage of the
native population and the percentage of the native population with a house-
hold member abroad), income per person (thousands of 2000 US $ in PPP)
and the employment rate in the destination country. In column 2 we allow
the dependent variable to have negative values (i.e. the negative net migra-
tion rates were not set to zero). In column 3 we add some basic geographical
and cultural distance controls: the logarithm of bilateral distance, a common
border dummy and a dummy for a common oﬃcial language. In column 4 we
also add variables proxying for more specific dimension of cultural and insti-
tutional distance between countries. They involve a dummy for common legal
origin, one for common currency, the number of landlocked countries in the
pair, a measure of religious distance and a measure of genetic distance, taken
from Ortega and Peri (2014) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). These spec-
ifications identify the role of economic variables, networks and costs driven
by diﬀerences in determining potential migration rates. In column 5 we in-
clude also the 2000-2010 growth rate of income in the destination country to
check whether it aﬀects potential migration. As mentioned above the com-
parison of benefits and costs in the decision to migrate should be based on
long-run expectations, captured by average diﬀerences in income per person
more than by recent growth rates. Specification 6 includes two measures of
immigration policies: a dummy for those countries with free labor mobility
between them in 2000, namely the EU18 countries among themselves and
with Switzerland, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland
and Finland) among themselves, and a dummy for those countries having a
visa waiver agreement for travel between them (Neumayer, 2006). Finally, in
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column 7 we include only non-rich countries in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer-
ica as sending countries and we analyze whether the determinants of potential
migration from poorer countries systematically diﬀer from those estimated
using the whole set of countries. The results reported in the tables focus on
the role of economic, network and policy variables. While it is important
to control for geographical and cultural variables, those are hard to change
or to aﬀect. Therefore, we include them as controls and comment only on
some main coeﬃcient estimates but we do not report their coeﬃcients in the
tables.
 Table 4 about here 
 Table 5 about here 
Migrant networks and economic incentives
Let us first focus on the eﬀects of network and economic variables on potential
migration rates. The first two rows of Tables 4 and 5 show the impact of
the stock of existing migrants abroad as of 2000 and the eﬀect of the share
of people in the country with a household member abroad. While the first
variable was constructed based on the data of Artuç et al. (forthcoming)
and Brücker et al. (2013) on the stock of migrants, the second is obtained
from the Gallup poll data. It represents the share of natives in country 
who said they had a household member who migrated to country  within
the previous five years. This allows us to link individuals with their more
recent and more direct “connections” then construct an aggregate measure
of it. This measure of networks is related more directly to the possibility
of natives receiving information about country  and assistance once in the
destination. The correlation between these network variables equals 0.16 for
the college-educated and 0.43 for the less educated. Both network variables
have a positive and significant eﬀect on potential migration for college and
non-college educated (rows 1 and 2 of Tables 4 and 5). Both explanatory
variables are divided by their standard deviation so that the coeﬃcient shows
the impact on potential migration rates from increasing the variable by one
standard deviation. Table 4 reveals that an increase in the stock of natives
in country  by one standard deviation increases the potential migration rate
of non-college educated to that country by 0.73 to 0.95 percentage points,
while the eﬀect for college educated is around 1 percentage point. Increasing
the share of people with household members in country  by one standard
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deviation increases the potential migration rate of college educated by about
2 percentage points and of non-college educated by 1 percentage point. Recall
that the average migration rate for non-college (college) educated was 0.49
percent (0.71 percent).
Hence, potential migration is very responsive to the stock of existing
compatriots and household members abroad. This confirms previous evi-
dence (e.g. Hanson and McIntosh, 2010; Hatton and Williamson, 2005) and
emphasizes the additional eﬀect of recent household links in encouraging po-
tential migration. For many important corridors, the network eﬀect is a key
correlate of potential migration. For example, potential migration rates from
Mexico to the United States are equal to 16.0 and 17.5 percent for college ed-
ucated and the less educated. Two thirds of those values can be explained by
network eﬀects. Indeed, the Mexican diaspora in the United States amounts
to about 5.2 million people, representing 11.2 percent of the Mexican pop-
ulation aged 25 and over (6.3 standard deviations in the aggregate network
variable). The proportion of Mexican households having a household mem-
ber who migrated in the previous five years is equal to 2 percent for college
educated and 4.5 percent for the less educated (i.e. 2.5 and 5.6 standard
deviations). Obviously, causal relationships are diﬃcult to establish in a
cross-country framework and our estimates are more correlation than cau-
sation. Taken at face value, our estimates suggest that each network eﬀect
increases the potential migration rate by 5 to 6 percentage points. As for
the Turkey-to-Germany corridor, the potential migration rate of low-skilled
Turks equals 3 percent. Again, two thirds of this rate (2.2 percentage points)
is explained by the network eﬀects. An important caveat is that the stock
of migrants abroad may capture not only network eﬀects but also the per-
sistence of bilateral relations that have increased migration in the past and
continue to do so. Controlling for that, the measure of people with household
members recently migrated abroad has an additional and important eﬀect.
It could be more directly connected to the diﬀusion of information and the
presence of potential support at destination, but could also reveal some ag-
gregate collective decision of families due to unobserved factors aﬀecting their
willingness to migrate. The fact that we control for country of origin eﬀects,
and that we focus on the aggregate (and not family-level) eﬀects reduces the
risk of omitted variable bias.
Crucial to our analysis is the role of economic variables in determining
potential migration. In the section describing the theoretical framework we
assumed that income per person and the employment rate at destination
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proxy for the long-term expected gains of migrating as they allow migrants
to predict their future income and probability of employment. The large
international diﬀerences in these variables are likely to be known to poten-
tial migrants and hence to aﬀect their preferred destination. It is therefore
reassuring to see that both variables strongly aﬀect potential migration rates
for both more and less educated. The coeﬃcients are similarly significant
for college and non-college educated, although somewhat larger for the first
group. From Table 4 we see that a diﬀerence in income per person of 10,000
PPP US $ in 2000 (which equals one standard deviation in the income per
person distribution of the 30 destination countries and corresponds to the
diﬀerence in income per person between the UK and the US) increases the
potential migration rate by 0.20 percentage points for the less educated (for
an average of 0.49 percent) and by 0.30 percentage points for college edu-
cated (for an average of 0.71 percent). An increase in the employment rate of
10 percentage points (also close to the standard deviation across destination
countries) would increase potential migration by 0.05 percentage points for
less educated and by 0.10 percentage points for more educated. The esti-
mates are very significant and stable across specifications. Income per capita
- for which information is more easily available - has the largest eﬀect and the
response of the less educated to diﬀerences in that variable is only 50 percent
smaller than the response of college educated. This diﬀerence can be due to
the fact that in richer countries, highly educated get a higher absolute wage
premium implying that they would be more willing to migrate (Grogger and
Hanson, 2011). This confirms that less educated migrants, when choosing
whether to look for migration opportunities, are driven by the same consid-
erations (income and jobs) as college educated and their response to those
variables is also quantitatively similar to the response of college educated.
The estimates in Tables 4 and 5 reveal two other important features of
potential migration. First, focusing on the last column 7 in which the sample
is limited to non-rich countries of origin (outside of Europe, North America
and Oceania), we see that the responses of desired migration rates from these
countries to income per person and employment rates in the destination are
very similar to the responses obtained with the full sample. College and
non-college educated migrants from poor countries respond to income and
employment at destination in a similar way as migrants from other countries.
The only variable that seems to matter somewhat more for potential migrants
in poor countries is the stock of nationals having migrated previously to .
Networks measured as the share of natives with a household member abroad,
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however, have the same impact on poor countries as in the full sample. This
possibly implies that the stock of past migrants reveals past preferential
relations between the poor country and the destination (driven by cultural,
colonial or other non-observable ties).
The second interesting fact is revealed by columns 5-7. While income per
person levels as of 2000 have a strong and positive correlation with potential
migration, the growth rate of income per person at destination in 2000-2010
has an insignificant eﬀect. Potential migrants are less aﬀected in their pref-
erences for migrating and where to migrate, by recent/potential economic
performance of the destination. The US and Canada remain very attractive
destinations for potential migrants from Guatemala, even in decades when
their economy was not growing very fast. The marginal eﬀect of growth over
a decade on cross-country diﬀerences in GDP per person is small and hence
does not aﬀect much the pool of potential migrants. This is strongly con-
firmed by our results. We show evidence below that faster growth increases
actual migration rates to a country. Our framework allows us to understand
why. Faster growth means more opportunities for migrants as new firms and
higher productivity generate vacancies and migration opportunities in des-
tination countries. Whereas the flow of actual migrants benefits from that
growth, the stock of potential migrants is not much aﬀected.
Geography, Culture and Policies
If the decisions to be a potential migrant is driven by cost-return calculations
only and it is not aﬀected by the probability of securing an opportunity to
migrate, we would not expect the policy variables in the destination country,
which aﬀect only the opportunities but not the costs/benefits once migrated,
to play a crucial role in determining potential migration. Policies are, how-
ever, expected to play a role in determining actual migration. Variables mea-
suring geographical, cultural and institutional distance, on the other hand,
should aﬀect the cost of migration through their impact on the transferability
of skills, and could as such have an eﬀect on potential migration.
In columns 4 and 5 we include several controls capturing geography, cul-
ture and institutions. We do not show their coeﬃcients in the tables but
we comment on their estimates here. First, the addition of these controls
does not change the size and significance of the coeﬃcients of economic and
network variables. Second, we should keep in mind that we are already con-
trolling for the past stock of migrants and presence of household members
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abroad. Those clearly capture a large part of the eﬀect of geography, culture
and institutions, which are slow to change or do not change at all, on past
migration. Worth mentioning is that the logarithm of distance is not signifi-
cant for either more or less educated. Common language is the only variable
significant for potential migration rates of both college and non-college ed-
ucated (with a larger coeﬃcient, 0.88, for college educated than for the less
educated, 0.44). No other geographical variable is significant at the 1 per-
cent level for non-college educated, while colonial ties (0.48, standard error
of 0.17) and genetic distance (t-statistic of -4.93) appear significant for po-
tential migration of college educated. These checks confirm the relevance of
geographical, cultural and historical ties for bilateral migration as established
in the empirical literature (see among others Hatton and Williamson, 2005;
Pedersen et al., 2008; Mayda, 2010; Grogger and Hanson, 2011).[9] Here we
are more interested in verifying that after including them as controls for bi-
lateral migration costs, the magnitude and significance of the main economic
variables aﬀecting expected gains from migration are preserved. The results
of columns 3 and 4 in Tables 3 and 4 confirm that this is the case as the
coeﬃcients on the income per person and employment rates remain virtually
unchanged.
In column 6 of Tables 4 and 5 we introduce two policy variables. The
first is a variable aimed at capturing free labor mobility across countries.
The second is a dummy indicating a visa waiver agreement when travel-
ing between the countries. Other papers (e.g. Mayda, 2010; Ortega and
Peri, 2013) included several measures of immigration policies capturing the
restrictiveness of provisions such as visa policies, quotas or asylum policies
to analyze how they aﬀect migration. Here we take a simpler approach.
Since it is very complicated to measure or even rank the restrictiveness of
immigration policies, we identify only two policies, which can substantially
aﬀect cross-border mobility in general, and for working purposes in particu-
lar. Specifically, we consider the elimination of all immigration restrictions
to labor mobility between countries and the presence of a visa waiver agree-
ment between countries that allows people to visit without obtaining a visa
(shown by Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas, 2013, to be an important variable
in determining bilateral mobility). In the presence of free labor mobility,
people from a country can work freely at the same conditions as natives in
a foreign country. This type of policy was established across countries of
the European Union by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, since the
1990’s, Switzerland and the Nordic countries of Europe (Norway, Sweden,
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Finland, Denmark and Iceland) have signed bilateral agreements ensuring
free labor mobility of their workers with all the EU countries. Hence, we
include bilateral dummies to capture the free mobility arrangements across
these countries which were in place as of 2000, the initial year in our analysis.
The estimates in column 6 reveal that neither the presence of free migra-
tion policies nor visa waiver agreements aﬀect the pool of potential migrants
both for college and non-college educated. While the presence of such bilat-
eral agreements may proxy also for other bilateral policies, it makes sense
to find that potential migration is not aﬀected by them. Note that while
these policies aﬀect the probability of having an “opportunity” to migrate
to a specific country, they do not aﬀect costs or benefits from such opportu-
nity. Potential migration reflects preferences, costs and benefits for bilateral
migration choices in the presence of an opportunity. Policies aﬀecting the
opportunities to migrate should not aﬀect that calculation.
Robustness checks
In Table 6 we subject our estimates of the determinants of potential migra-
tion rates to a number of robustness checks. The table shows specifications
including all the controls from column 5 in Tables 3 and 4, to which we alter-
natively add diﬀerent controls or for which we modify the sample in diﬀerent
specifications. Columns 1 to 3 show the results for the less educated, while
columns 4 to 6 show those for college educated. In specifications 1 and 4
we include continent-destination dummies in order to take into account the
fact that destination countries in Europe or North America might have par-
ticular policies or characteristics in common, and in order to accommodate
the possibility that the choice of migration within a continent is correlated
(as pointed out by Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas, 2013). The estimates of
the main coeﬃcients are again stable in magnitude and significance. Only
the employment rate becomes less significant, which is certainly due to the
smaller within-continent variation of this rate across countries. The growth of
GDP per person even becomes negative in this specification, confirming that
people do not account for recent performance when choosing their “desired”
migration countries, but rather compare long-lasting diﬀerences in income
per person.
Columns 2 and 5 analyze whether considering only “desired” migration
rates rather than potential (thus excluding people who actually migrated)
changes the eﬀect of economic determinants. This allows us to verify that the
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subset of actual migrants is not a “special” group among potential migrants
in terms of their response to economic incentives. For both college and non-
college educated the estimates are similar to those of column 5 in Tables 4
and 5, confirming that those economic variables aﬀect all potential migrants,
independent of whether they succeed in migrating or not. Finally, as the data
on desire to migrate are based on Gallup Polls that include only a few hundred
people in some small countries, we include a check on the reliability of those
data. In particular, we drop from the regressions all the bilateral desired
migration rates based on less than 75 respondents (for the less educated)
and less than 37 respondents for college educated. This reduces the sample
(inclusive of all non-missing controls) from 3,744 observations to 3,278. The
point estimates of the eﬀects, however, show that the results are robust even
to selecting only the most reliable bilateral potential migration rates and that
economic and network variables play the same important role.
 Table 6 about here 
POTENTIAL MIGRANTS, MIGRATION OPPORTUNITIES
AND ACTUAL MIGRANTS
The analysis so far shows that income per person, employment probability
and the presence of networks from the same country of origin (either mea-
sured as the stock of previous immigrants or as the share of natives with a
household member abroad) are robust and significant determinants of poten-
tial migrants. They contribute importantly to determining the size of the
pool of people searching for migration opportunities. But how do these po-
tential migrants turn into actual migrants? What factors aﬀect the actual
migration rates on top of the potential migration rates? Which share of po-
tential migrants become actual migrants? These are the questions we will
focus on in the present section.
In Tables 7, 8, 10 and 11 we estimate variations of equation (4) in which
the dependent variable is the actual migration rate from country  to country
 , with the potential migration rate as the first explanatory variable.
We include an array of destination country characteristics that may aﬀect
migration opportunities and hence the number of actual migrants. We al-
ways control for country of origin fixed eﬀects. Tables 7 and 8 show the
results of the main specifications, for the less educated and college educated,
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respectively. Table 10 analyzes whether labor mobility policies, networks and
growth of economic opportunities in the destination countries interacted with
potential migrants aﬀect actual rates. Table 11, finally, considers whether
actual migration from low-income countries of origin (in Asia, Africa and
South America) responded diﬀerently to potential migration and other fac-
tors potentially aﬀecting migration opportunities.
Economic opportunities and migration policies
The basic specification (1) in Tables 7 and 8 includes only country of origin
fixed eﬀects, the potential emigration rate and growth of GDP per person
and of employment probability (employment/population at working age) in
the destination countries. Growth in GDP per person between 2000-2010
and potential migration rates turn out to be the most relevant and signifi-
cant determinants of actual migration rates. Growth in the employment rate
between 2000-2010 appears to have a less relevant impact that is sometimes
even negative for college educated migrants. As a check, we included the
GDP level, bilateral geography and cultural controls and found neither sig-
nificant eﬀects nor impacts on the other coeﬃcients. Let us focus, therefore,
on the two most significant variables: growth of GDP per person and the
potential migration rate. What is noteworthy is that while those variables
aﬀect migration rates for both non-college and college educated, the impact
is much stronger and significant for the latter. While an increase in poten-
tial migration rates by 1 percentage point produces an increase in actual
migration by only 0.04 percentage points for the less educated individuals,
it is associated with an increase by 0.13 percent for college educated. Simi-
larly, an increase in GDP per person by 20 percent in the decade (equivalent
to 2 percent per year which is roughly the mean and standard deviation of
this variable across destination countries) increases actual migration rates by
0.016 percentage points for college educated and by only 0.004 percentage
points for the less educated. Recall for comparison that the impact of GDP
per capita levels at destination on potential migration rates were almost the
same for college and non-college educated.
 Table 7 about here 
 Table 8 about here 
Overall we find that the response of college educated actual migration
rates to growth rates and to potential migration rates is three times larger
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than for non-college educated. Hence, on average, a much larger share of
college-educated potential migrants turns into actual migrants, and favorable
economic conditions at destination increase their actual migration rates much
more than those of less educated individuals. This implies, for instance, that
in spite of a much higher potential migration rate of non-college educated
from India to the US (around 1 percent) than from India to Spain (around
0.003 percent) - this will only translate in an actual rate to the US 0.05
percent higher than the one to Spain. For college educated, in contrast, the
desired migration rate to the US, which equaled 8 percent relative to Spain
(equal to 0.02 percent), predicts a 1.04 percent higher actual migration rate
to the US than to Spain. The actual diﬀerence in migration rates for college
educated from India to the US and to Spain is 2.7 percent, and 40% of it
can therefore be explained by the diﬀerence in the pool of potential migrants
to each country. The diﬀerence in potential migration rates of non-college
educated to the two countries, on the other hand, did not explain much of
their actual diﬀerence.
To illustrate the importance of the diﬀerence in realization rates be-
tween college-educated and less educated potential migrants, we simulated
the net immigration rates under the assumption that the migration opportu-
nity matching rate of the less educated was equal to that of college educated
(i.e. that they had a realization rate of 0.13 instead of 0.04). Our simula-
tion assumes that corridors with zero migrants remain empty. This can be
thought as a drastic policy experiment (such a policy is clearly not on the
political agenda) that equalizes the migration opportunities of college and
non-college educated. Table 9 presents the simulated realization rates by
destination country. Columns 1 to 3 show the change in immigration flows,
whereas changes in immigration rates are obtained by comparing columns 4
and 5 (for the less educated) and columns 6 and 7 (for all migrants). The
total inflow of less educated migrants to our destinations increases by 14.7
million (+117 percent) of whom 39 percent would move to the United States.
The other important destinations are Spain, Saudi Arabia, France, Italy and
Germany. In relative terms, the largest changes in low-skilled immigration
rates are observed for New Zealand (+10.3 percentage points), the United
States (+7.8), Switzerland (+6.2) and in the Persian Gulf countries. The
same patterns are obtained for total immigration rates.
 Table 9 about here 
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It could be argued that measuring migration potential in a bilateral way
results in measurement error and hence in an underestimation of the ef-
fect of potential migration on actual migration if potential migrants have a
clear preference for migrating but a weak preference for specific countries.
To assess the severity of this bias, we redefine potential and net migration
aggregated over all countries of destination and run a number of specifica-
tions keeping only the country of origin dimension. In order to avoid too
demanding specifications (as we only have 138 observations) we only include
the stock of people with a household member abroad and GDP per person
in the country of origin as controls. Table A2 in the appendix shows the
estimated coeﬃcient of potential rates on actual rates. In the specification
with networks and income controls, the estimate of the rate at which poten-
tial migrants turn into net migrants is 0.18 for college educated and 0.03 for
non-college educated. These rates are not too far from those estimated us-
ing the bilateral definitions (0.13 and 0.04 respectively), suggesting that the
impact on actual migration rates from considering aggregate instead of bi-
lateral potential migration is fairly similar. While bilateral preferences may
be imprecise, they still seem to reveal useful information on the potential
destination of migrants.
Coming back to our regression results, column 2 of Tables 7 and 8 analyze
whether the level of GDP per person and the employment rate in the desti-
nation country aﬀect actual migration for either skill level, after controlling
for potential migrants and GDP growth. The estimates reveal that destina-
tion country GDP per person and employment probability do not matter in
determining opportunities, once potential migrants are controlled for. This
confirms the presumption that income levels in the destination country only
aﬀect migration through their eﬀect on potential migrants (shown in Tables 4
and 5), as they serve as proxies for present discounted return from migrating.
Also, in line with Grogger and Hanson (2011), positive selection in actual mi-
gration is positively associated with the GDP level at destination. A 10,000
PPP US $ increase in GDP per capita increases potential migration by 0.30
and 0.20 percentage points for college educated and the less educated, which,
in turn, increases actual migration by 0.026 and 0.008 percentage points (i.e.
030 × 0136 and 020 × 004), respectively. A simple numerical experiment
reveals that the total migration flow would be 21 percent greater if income
per capita in the 30 destination countries (an average of 27,606 PPP US $)
was equal to the US level (i.e. 39,175 PPP US $). College educated would
be more responsive (+25 percent) than the less educated (+17 percent).
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Column 3 analyzes whether the presence of family networks aﬀects oppor-
tunities to migrate, after controlling for potential migration rates. In Tables
4 and 5 we saw that networks were crucial to increase the pool of potential
migrants to a destination country. The impact of networks, measured as the
stock of existing migrants or the share of natives with a household member
abroad was estimated to be very large. A one standard deviation increase
of the network in country  corresponded to a one percentage point higher
potential migration rate for college and non-college educated (relative to an
average of 0.49 and 0.71 percentage points for non-college educated and col-
lege educated, respectively). Do networks also increase actual migration once
we control for potential migration? The estimates in column 3 of Tables 7
and 8 show that their impact on actual migration after controlling for the
potential rate is smaller and not always significant. For non-college educated,
the impact corresponds to a 0.03 percent increase for each standard devia-
tion. Considering that the direct eﬀect of networks on potential rates was
around 0.9 (for a standard deviation increase) and that potential rates trans-
late into actual rates with a coeﬃcient of 0.04 for non-college educated, the
eﬀect of networks through potential migration (09×004 = 0036) is as large
as the direct eﬀect on creating opportunities for less educated migrants. For
college educated, the eﬀect of their network on migration opportunities was
not significant, as they probably become aware of them more easily through
other (work or professional) channels. Still the impact on potential migrants
was very large.
Columns 4 and 5 introduce the free labor mobility and visa waiver dum-
mies. In column 4, we include the policy dummies for all those pairs of coun-
tries with bilateral agreements as of 2000, the beginning of the period we
consider. Free labor mobility could in principle significantly increase actual
migration by creating migration opportunities that were previously denied.
Similarly, the presence of a visa waiver agreement can make a country more
accessible to foreign travelers, especially from less developed countries.
Neither policies automatically imply migration opportunities, jobs or de-
mand for migrants. The estimates show that both free mobility and visa
waiver agreements increased actual migration rates for non-college educated
by around 0.01 percent, which is a very modest amount. For college edu-
cated, the eﬀects were not significant. This is a first sign that it may take
more than simple bilateral mobility agreements to generate migration oppor-
tunities. One may also argue that countries agreeing to mutual free labor
mobility or visa waiving are those with similar characteristics (Neumayer,
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2006), which would result in lower gains for migrants. Hence, a free labor
market or a visa waiving agreement does not per se need to stimulate mobil-
ity across those countries. Finally, one might reason that the 2000s formed
a period of slow growth in Europe (with a deep recession and financial crisis
towards the end of the decade), which may have discouraged migration alto-
gether. In general, once geographical and cultural proximity are controlled
for (distance, border, language and legal origin dummies), the free labor
mobility dummy becomes weakly significant, even for non-college educated.
Thus, our results suggest that economic growth, more than free labor
migration policies is a proximate determinant of actual migration rates of
non-college educated, once we control for potential rates. Overall, we find
that free labor mobility policies and the visa waiver policies did not have a
strong impact on migration, on creating actual migration opportunities over
the 2000-2010 period, or on increasing the pool of potential migrants.
In column 6 of Tables 7 and 8 we calculate potential migration including
only those individuals who revealed a preference for permanent migration.
As net migration rates capture long-run permanent changes, they might be
expected to be most aﬀected by potentially permanent migrants. In line with
this intuition, we find that the impact of permanent potential migrants on
actual net migration is somewhat stronger than that of total potential migra-
tion (with a coeﬃcient of 0.058 for non-college educated and 0.17 for college
educated). The eﬀect of the remaining variables remains largely unchanged.
The intentions to migrate permanently and their distribution across coun-
try couples are in fact very strongly correlated to the overall intentions to
migrate[10].
Interactions with potential migration rates
Economic growth in the destination countries encourages migration flows
by creating new opportunities. Was this eﬀect stronger for origin countries
that had a larger potential migration rate to that destination? Similarly,
did free migration policies and networks interact with the pool of potential
migrants from specific origins so that their eﬀect was not linear but larger for
countries with more potential migrants? The linear form of equation (4) is a
simplification. Including some interaction terms would allow for a diﬀerent
marginal eﬀect of policies and economic opportunities depending on the size
of the potential migrant pool.
In Table 10 we interact the “potential migration variable” with the growth
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of GDP per person at destination (columns 1 and 3), or with the free mi-
gration and visa waiver dummies (columns 2 and 4) or with the size of the
network of household members abroad (specifications 3 and 6). The interac-
tion variables are divided by their standard deviation so that the coeﬃcients
are easier to interpret. The table shows the impact on non-college educated
(columns 1-3) and college educated (columns 4-6) migration rates. The only
interaction eﬀect that turns out to be significant is that of GDP per capita
growth and potential rates for the non-college educated (as well as that of
the visa waiver dummy with potential rates for college educated, though only
marginally significant and negative). In fact, an acceleration of GDP growth
by 1.5 percent per year in the US relative to an acceleration by 1.5 percent
per year in Spain would generate an interaction with potential migration
from India of about 15 percent in the US and almost zero in Spain, which is
about one standard deviation of the interaction. The actual migration rate of
less educated from India would thus be 0.027 percentage points larger to the
US than to Spain as a consequence of their common higher growth rate but
diﬀerent migration potentials. This also implies, for instance, that growth in
the US would attract a much larger number of migrants from Mexico than
a similar growth rate in Europe would. Faster growth in Germany would,
vice-versa, produce a larger eﬀect on emigration for less educated Turkish
nationals than would be produced by growth in any other country (as the
potential migration rate for less educated from Turkey to Germany was larger
than 3 percent compared to a potential rate of less than 1 percent towards
any other country).
 Table 10 about here 
Interestingly, economic growth produced opportunities for actual migra-
tion and attracted less educated more strongly from countries with larger
potential migration rates. Less educated actual migration appears to be
higher for countries with a visa waiver agreement, yet the interaction term
with potential migration appears insignificant. Free mobility of labor laws,
on the other hand, did not aﬀect the actual migration rates (for college nor
for non-college educated) nor did they aﬀect them diﬀerentially depending
on migration potentials. The strongest results from the analysis of actual mi-
gration is the diﬀerence between college and non-college educated in the rate
at which potential migrants turn into actual migrants. This rate seems to be
somewhat aﬀected by economic growth at destination but does not seem to
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be systematically influenced by free mobility policies or by the presence of
networks.
Diﬀerences between rich and poor countries of origin
In Table 11 we analyze whether the relationship between potential migrants,
migration opportunities and actual migrants is diﬀerent when considering
only poor countries of origin. We select countries of origin in Asia, Latin
America and Africa (omitting therefore the rich continents of the world) and
estimate specifications similar to the basic ones in Tables 7, 8 and 9. The ba-
sic specification (columns 1 and 4) shows that, as found for the total sample,
potential emigration rates aﬀect actual ones and this eﬀect is much stronger
for college educated (coeﬃcient of 0.22) than for non-college educated (co-
eﬃcient of 0.05). The estimated values are close to those estimated for the
whole sample and possibly somewhat larger, especially for college educated.
The sensitivity of actual migration rates to growth rates at destination, con-
trolling for potential rates is also roughly as before, and 3 to 4 times larger
for college educated than for non-college educated. These results suggest
that, for less developed countries, there is no particular intensity of selection
of potential migrants into actual ones.
Furthermore, we see that income levels and employment rates at desti-
nation (columns 2 and 5) do not additionally aﬀect actual migration rates
aside from their impact on potential rates. Moreover, higher growth rates at
destination stimulate actual migration and they have a stronger eﬀect (in-
teraction) on countries with a larger migration potential (columns 3 and 6).
Finally, the visa waiver policies have a minor positive eﬀect on migration rates
of non-college educated. The similarity of the coeﬃcients estimated in Table
11 with those for the whole sample in Tables 7 and 8 implies that migrants
from poorer countries of origin, especially the less educated ones, are not
diﬀerent from migrants from richer countries in their response to incentives.
Similarly, potential college educated migrants from low-income countries of
origin have a much larger probability of becoming actual migrants relative to
the less educated. Hence, immigration opportunities in the considered desti-
nation countries (aﬀected by the economy, policy and other factors) do not
seem to “discriminate” based on the origin of immigrants, but are certainly
more accessible for individuals with a college education. Alternatively, more
educated people might simply be better in realizing migration potentials by
searching for the right opportunities. Understanding better what determines
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the diﬀerence in transforming potential migrants into actual migrants be-
tween college and non-college educated is a very important step to predict
the future of migration flows in the world. The data and simple procedures
used in this paper are a starting point for this analysis.
 Table 11 about here 
CONCLUSIONS
Potential migrants are those people who aspire to migrate and look for mi-
gration opportunities. Actual migrants are those among potential migrants,
that found and took advantage of a migration opportunity, and moved to
a foreign country. We first identify the pool of potential migrants and the
success of that pool in becoming actual migrants, using original data on the
desire (willingness) to migrate and eﬀective net migration from 138 origin
countries to 30 major destinations over the 2000-2010 period. We then em-
pirically study the determinants of potential migration and its realization
rate, highlighting the role of economic factors, networks and migration poli-
cies.
Interestingly, our results are consistent with rational behavior—the income
level and employment probability at destination, as well as the presence of
networks of co-nationals, are crucial determinants of the pool of potential
migrants. However, in turning potential migrants into actual migrants, the
factors that matter most are having a college education and the growth per-
spectives in the receiving country. According to our estimates one out of
five college educated potential migrants became an actual migrant (within
the considered decade), while only one in twenty potential migrants among
non-college educated finally migrated.
The migration literature has established the value of analytically sepa-
rating migration aspirations from opportunities to migrate (Carling, 2002).
The economic literature, on the other hand, has mainly focused on actual
migration rates without diﬀerentiating non-migrants by whether or not they
are searching for migration opportunities (Grogger and Hanson, 2011). This
study connects the two-step approach to migration with economic modeling.
We emphasize the most interesting and selective step in the process: from po-
tential to actual migrants. This is a passage that is only understood if we take
a two-step approach. We hope that through the use of uniquely large-scale
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data, additional theoretical sources, and new methodological frameworks, we
contribute to further strengthening the two-step approach to international
migration.
Notes
[1]In the two dataset used in this paper, the definition of college educated is slightly
diﬀerent. In the data on actual migration college educated are defined as described here.
In the Gallup poll only individuals with a college degree are defined as college educated
(we do not have information on individuals who attended college without graduating).
Hence we use the desired migration rates for college graduates and apply them to to the
population of all college educated.
[2]In the Appendix, we describe in greater detail the methodology and the original data
used to construct actual and desired migration rates. We also show in Table A3 the
summary statistics for all 138 countries of origin.
[3]See Smith and Swanson (1998) and Rogers (1990) for a discussion of the pros and cons
in the use of net and gross migration rates.
[4]It could be argued that individuals are willing to migrate to many diﬀerent destinations
and decide which country to move to only once an opportunity arises. In this case the
only meaningful distinction would be between willing and non-willing, making the bilateral
preferences irrelevant. We will describe and analyze overall emigration rates (rather than
bilateral) as well. Their responses to economic and network variables are similar to the
response of bilateral rates implying that we are not distorting the choice too much by
analyzing potential migration as bilateral preferences.
[5]A Random Utility Maximization model with (i) individuals with heterogeneous pref-
erences, maximizing utility that depends on the same arguments as function  above, and
(ii) errors following a Gumbel distribution, would produce a linear relation between the
logarithm of , the odds-ratio of migrating or not, and the arguments of the function
 . This simpler form can be considered a linear approximation of the former.
[6]The variable is constructed as the share of the resident population answering yes to
the question: “Have any members of your household gone to live in a foreign country
permanently or temporarily in the past five years?".
[7]The total number of observations for actual migration from 143 origins into 30 des-
tinations is 5,673. However, we are missing desired migration data for some countries
of origin (mainly small developing countries) that therefore are dropped, leaving us with
4,247 observations. Eliminating observations five times larger than the standard deviation,
we are left with 4,162 valid observations.
[8]The remaining summary statistics for the other control and explanatory variables are
reported in Table A1 in the appendix.
[9]There is also a large literature analyzing the impact of these bilateral factors on trade.
See e.g. Ortega and Peri (2014).
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[10]Further checks and regressions that we performed and do not report convinced us that
potential migration rates (both bilateral and aggregate by origin) are very highly correlated
whether calculated using total migration or only permanent migration intensions. Hence
we used total potential migration throughout the paper.
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Data Appendix
We construct bilateral data on actual migration rates () and willingness
(or desire) to emigrate () for college educated and less educated individ-
uals ( = ), for 138 countries of origin ( = 1  138) and 30 countries
of destination ( = 1  30) for the period 2000-2010. These rates are ex-
pressed as percent of the non-migrant, native population aged 25 and over in
country  in the year 2000. Potential migration rates are simply defined as
the sum of actual and desired migration:  ≡  + . This appendix
describes our data sources and methodology.
Actual migration
Our starting point is the recent IAB database described in Brücker et al.
(2013). They document the bilateral migration stocks () of individ-
uals aged 25 and over by education level, from 195 origin countries to 20 des-
tination countries, from 1980 to 2010 in 5-year intervals ( = 1980  2010).
We only use the 2000 and 2010 waves and proxy net migration flows by
taking the diﬀerence between the migrant stock in 2010 and 2000:  =
2010 − 2000 (as in Beine et al., 2011; or Docquier et al.,
2014).
The IAB database relies on census and register data collected from 20
major OECD destination countries. As for the year 2000, they obtained
census or register data from all countries. As far as 2010 is concerned, they
obtained census data for 8 countries (Denmark, France, Finland, Germany,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the US); 2010 was extrapolated on
the basis of 2005-06 census data in 4 other cases (Australia, Canada, Ireland,
New Zealand). In the other 8 cases (Austria, Chile, Greece, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and UK), they imputed 2010 stocks on the basis
of the 1990-2000 growth rates.
To cover the most important receiving countries of the world (many of
which are reported as preferred destinations of would-be migrants), we extend
the IAB database and construct estimates of net migration flows to 10 addi-
tional destination countries (Belgium, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and United Arab Emirates). For these
countries, bilateral migration data of individuals aged 25 and over are pro-
vided for the year 2000 and by education level in Artuç et al. (forthcoming).
We combine them with the United Nations database on bilateral migrant
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stocks from 1990 to 2010 without education breakdown and the 25-years-old
threshold. Specifically, we multiply the 2000 bilateral stocks of Artuç et al.
by the 2000-2010 bilateral growth factors of the United Nations. This sim-
ply means that we assume the growth rate of total bilateral migrant stocks
to be identical to that of the bilateral stock of migrants aged 25 and over.
We also assume there are 10 percentage points more college educated in the
2000-2010 net migration flow than in the 2000 migration bilateral stock, an
assumption in line with the IAB database.
The database of Artuç et al. also documents the size and structure of the
non-migrant population in each origin country in 2000,  ≡ 2000 .
Actual migration rates during the period 2000-2010 are thus defined as = .
Willingness to emigrate
The Gallup World Polls identify individuals expressing a desire to emigrate
permanently or temporarily to another country. Individual data are available
on a yearly basis from 2007 to 2013: we aggregate the seven waves to compute
desired emigration rates around the year 2010. This allows us to limit the
number of missing cells and increase the accuracy of our estimates. Adding
these desired migrants in 2010 to the actual net migration flows will give the
potential net migration flows between 2000 and 2010.
A typical Gallup survey interviews about a 1,000 randomly selected in-
dividuals within each country. In some large countries such as China, India
and Russia as well as in major cities or areas of special interest, over-samples
are collected resulting in larger total numbers of respondents. The data are
collected through telephone surveys in countries where the telephone cover-
age represents at least 80 percent of the population. In Central and Eastern
Europe, as well as in the developing world, including much of Latin Amer-
ica, the former Soviet Union countries, nearly all of Asia, the Middle East,
and Africa, on the other hand, an area frame design is used for face-to-face
interviewing. As such, the sampling frame represents the entire civilian,
non-institutionalized population aged 15 and over covering the entire coun-
try including rural areas (with the exception of areas where the safety of the
interviewing staﬀ is threatened, scarcely populated islands in some countries,
and areas that interviewers can reach only by foot, animal, or small boat).
The survey covers 394,459 respondents, i.e. an average of 2,761 observations
per country. In some cases, the number of respondents is however small. As
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a robustness check, we will only consider countries where the willingness to
emigrate has been computed from at least 37 college-educated and 75 less
educated respondents.
The Gallup survey documents individual characteristics (such as age and
education) and includes two relevant questions on intentions to emigrate;
these questions were asked in 138 countries: (Q1) Ideally, if you had the
opportunity, would you like to move permanently or temporarily to another
country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country? And (Q2)
To which country would you like to move? In line with the actual migration
data, we only consider respondents aged 25 and over, and distinguish between
individuals with college education and the less educated.[11] By 2013, the 138
countries represented about 98 percent of the worldwide population aged 25
and over.
The first step consists of computing the aggregate proportion of individu-
als who express a willingness to leave their country, whatever their preferred
country of destination. We denote this proportion by b ( for all desti-
nations) for individuals of education type  living in country . To compute
desired emigration rates, we aggregate individual responses to Q1 and weigh
each observation by the relevant Gallup sample weight. These weights are de-
signed to compensate for the low coverage of certain groups (by gender, race,
age, educational attainment, and region) in the whole population. Gallup
assigns a weight to each respondent "so that the demographic characteristics
of the total weighted sample of respondents match the latest estimates of
the demographic characteristics of the adult population available" for the
country (Gallup, 2012). The willingness to migrate is given by the weighted
proportion of respondents who answered positively to Q1.
In the second step, we use responses to Q2 to disaggregate the number of
desired migrants by country of destination. For each origin country  and skill
type , bilateral desired migration rates (b) are obtained by multiplying
the total willingness to emigrate (b ) by the proportion of respondents
to Q2 who declared that country  is their preferred destination (). A
few desired migrants did not mention a desired destination (i.e. did not
respond to Q2) but this is rarely the case. Given the large response rates
to Q2, we ignore those who did not respond to Q2 to compute the bilateral
shares. Finally, a few respondents answered to Q2 and mentioned a preferred
destination without responding to Q1; we considered that they responded
“Yes” to Q1.
Given that we want our actual and desired emigration rates to be ex-
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pressed as percent of the non-migrant, native population aged 25 and over
in the year 2000, we correct for the change in the native population be-
tween 2000 and 2010, and compute our index of willingness to emigrate as
 = b20102000.
Explanatory variables
The definition and source of the variables used in the regressions are the
following:
• The stock of people born in country  resident of country  in 2000, in
percent of the population of non-migrant natives in  in 2000 ().
Source: See the actual migration section in the data appendix.
• The share of people aged 25 and older in and native to country  who re-
port to have a household member abroad times the share of people aged
25 and older in and native to country  who report to have a household
member in country , merged over all available waves between 2007
and 2013 (alternative measure of ). Source: Gallup’s World
Poll Database (see  for more details on data collection). Specifi-
cally, the propensity to have a household member abroad is obtained by
combining the following questions: “Have any members of your house-
hold gone to live in a foreign country permanently or temporarily in the
past five years?” and “In which country does/did he/she live?”. The
intensity of the diaspora connection is thus calculated as the product
of the propensity for natives of country  to reply positively to the first
question and the propensity that natives of country  report country
 as a settlement country for their household members abroad, each
time merging all survey waves between 2007 and 2013. Note that these
propensities are obtained using sample weights so that the demographic
characteristics of the total weighted sample of respondents match those
of the adult population in the respective country in terms of gender,
race, age, educational attainment and region (see Gallup, 2012). Again,
we correct for the change in the native population between 2000 and
2010 in order to express the stock of people with household members
abroad as a share of the non-migrant, native population aged 25 and
over in country  in the year 2000.
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• Gross domestic product per capita in the destination country in pur-
chasing power parities in 2005 international $ (Chain series) in 2000
(2000). Source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
• Employment as percentage of the population aged 15 and over in the
destination country (2000). Source: World Development Indicators
and Total Economy Database.
• Growth in gross domestic product per capita in the destination coun-
try in purchasing power parities in 2005 international $ (Chain series)
between 2000 and 2010 (00−10 ). Source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
• Growth in employment as percentage of the population aged 15 and
over in the destination country between 2000 and 2010 (00−10 ). Source:
World Development Indicators and Total Economy Database.
• Size of the population aged 25+ in the destination country in 2000
(ln). Source: Brücker et al. (2013).
• Set of bilateral variables capturing geographical, cultural and genetic
distance across countries (), including:
— Population-weighted distance in kilometers between  and  (taken
in logs). Source: CEPII Dyadic Distance Database (Mayer and
Zignago, 2011).
— Dummy for sharing a border. Source: CEPII Dyadic Distance
Database.
— Dummy for sharing a common oﬃcial primary language. Source:
CEPII Dyadic Distance Database.
— Dummy for sharing a common colonial past. Source: CEPII
Dyadic Distance Database.
— Dummy for sharing a common legal origin. Source: Ortega and
Peri (2014).
— Dummy for sharing a common currency. Source: Ortega and Peri
(2014).
— Number of landlocked countries in the country pair. Source:
CEPII Dyadic Distance Database.
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— Religious proximity between  and , i.e. the probability that
two individuals randomly selected from  and  share the same
religion. Source: Own calculations based on CIA World Factbook
data on country-specific religious adherence.
— Genetic distance between  and , i.e. the probability that two
alleles (a particular form taken by a gene) at a given locus selected
at random from two populations are diﬀerent (proxy for time since
isolation). Source: Spoalore and Warcziag (2009), definitions p.
480-485.
• Dummy for free labor mobility between  and  as of 2000 or 2010 (in
). The corridors which had free mobility in 2000 besides EU15-
EU15 involve the EU15 and Switzerland as well as Nordic countries,
i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In 2010, new
corridors involve free mobility between (i) new accession countries that
joined the EU between 2000 and 2010 (i.e. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia) and the EU15, Switzerland, Poland and Czech
Republic. Source: Own calculations.
• Dummy for the presence of a visa waiving agreement between  and 
in 2004 (in ). This visa waiving dummy is based on country of
citizenship rather than on country of birth. Source: Neumayer (2006)
based on the November 2004 edition of the International Civil Aviation
Association’s Travel Information Manual.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Aggregate statistics on actual and desired migration rates (2000-2010) 
As percentage points of the population in 2000 
 
 Aggregate 
Population-weighted 
Less educated 
Aggregate 
Population-weighted 
College educated 
Average 
Non-weighted 
Less educated 
Average 
Non-weighted 
College educated 
 
Actual and desired emigration rates, percentage points of the country-of-origin, native population 
 
Stock of emigrants/Native population 2000 1.8 5.8 6.4 34.9 
Actual emigration rate: Net emigrants 2000-2010 relative to 
native population in the country of origin, 2000 
0.4 3.9 1.1 30.3 
Desired rate: Willing to Migrate 2000-2010, still in the 
country,  relative to native population in the country of 
origin, 2000 
8.5 16.2 14.2 21.4 
 
Actual and desired immigration rates, percentage points of the country-of-destination, native population 
 
Stock of immigrants/Native population 2000 9.4 10.9 20.9 30.0 
Actual immigration rate: Net immigrants 2000-2010 relative 
to native population in the country of destination, 2000 
2.4 6.0 11.0 35.0 
Desired rate: Willing to Migrate 2000-2010, still in the 
country, relative to native population in the country of 
destination, 2000 
42.0 26.0 87.0 93.0 
 
Note: The stock of migrants and native population in 2000 are calculated using data from Artuc et al. (forthcoming) and Bruecker et al (2013). Net migration rates in the period 
2000-2010 are calculated as the difference in bilateral stocks of migrants 2010-2000, aggregated by country of origin or destination. Willingness to migrate is calculated as the 
share of people, among those interviewed by Gallup between 2007 and 2013, who have expressed a desire to migrate, if an opportunity arises. We consider 138 countries of origin 
and 30 destinations. 
50 
 
. 
Table 2: Actual and desired immigration rates of college educated and the less educated by destination country 
Destination Net rates  2000-2010 
Less educated 
Net rates 2000-2010 
College educated 
Skill Intensity Desired rates 
Less educated 
Desired rates 
 College educated 
Skill Intensity 
Australia -0.6 33.5 Skilled 148.6 245.4 Skilled 
Austria 3.1 11.7 Skilled 37.7 72.9 Skilled 
Belgium 2.0 11.8 Skilled 24.1 16.4 Unskilled 
Canada -0.8 71.2 Skilled 142.3 240.7 Skilled 
Chile 16.7 20.8 Skilled 6.0 9.3 Skilled 
Denmark 2.9 8.6 Skilled 30.5 62.9 Skilled 
Finland 2.4 5.6 Skilled 15.1 78.3 Skilled 
France 1.8 7.3 Skilled 41.7 71.3 Skilled 
Germany 0.8 0.9 Skilled 26.0 44.2 Skilled 
Greece 7.1 23.1 Skilled 20.5 34.1 Skilled 
Ireland 6.1 30.4 Skilled 63.1 88.7 Skilled 
Israel -18.7 2.3 Skilled 35.8 38.0 Skilled 
Italy 1.3 7.5 Skilled 24.4 67.7 Skilled 
Japan 0.2 0.7 Skilled 12.8 9.3 Unskilled 
Luxembourg 10.5 23.6 Skilled 119.5 118.6 Unskilled 
Mexico 0.1 1.3 Skilled 3.8 8.5 Skilled 
Netherlands -4.3 -0.9 Skilled 24.6 23.4 Unskilled 
New Zealand 9.1 8.7 Unskilled 212.4 154.6 Unskilled 
Norway 5.2 14.1 Skilled 48.0 78.5 Skilled 
Poland -0.9 1.0 Skilled 1.2 3.8 Skilled 
Portugal 6.7 21.4 Skilled 23.9 50.0 Skilled 
Russian Federation -2.7 1.0 Skilled 8.3 1.5 Unskilled 
Saudi Arabia 20.4 121.5 Skilled 300.0 173.4 Unskilled 
South Africa 2.8 18.4 Skilled 19.0 8.5 Unskilled 
Spain 10.6 20.0 Skilled 58.6 58.8 Skilled 
Sweden 4.7 15.4 Skilled 62.0 79.8 Skilled 
Switzerland 3.0 3.7 Skilled 119.9 295.5 Skilled 
United Arab Emirates 248.4 587.2 Skilled 937.7 622.4 Unskilled 
United Kingdom 0.9 26.3 Skilled 50.6 117.8 Skilled 
United States 6.3 3.9 Unskilled 92.8 12.9 Unskilled 
Average 11.1 35.8 Skilled 87.6 93.6 Skilled 
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Figure 1 
Potential and actual emigration rates of the less educated (138 countries of origin)  
 
 
Notes: Actual and potential emigration rates are calculated as described in the text. They are aggregated by country of origin. Each point shows the total actual and potential 
migration rate from one origin to all destinations.  
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Figure 2 
Potential and actual emigration rates of college educated (138 countries of origin) 
 
 
Notes: Actual and potential emigration rates are calculated as described in the text. They are aggregated by country of origin. Each point shows the total actual and potential 
migration rate from one origin to all destinations.   
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Figure 3 
Potential and actual immigration rates of the less educated (30 countries of destination) 
 
 
Notes: Actual and potential immigration rates are calculated by dividing the number of net migrants and potential migrants (2000-2010) by the native population in the destination 
country in 2000. They are aggregated by country of destination. Each point shows the total actual and potential migration rate from all origin countries to one destination.  
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Figure 4 
Potential and actual immigration rates of college educated (30 countries of destination) 
 
 
Notes: Actual and potential immigration rates are calculated by dividing the number of net migrants and potential migrants (2000-2010) by the native population in the destination 
country in 2000. They are aggregated by country of destination. Each point shows the total actual and potential migration rate from all origin countries to one destination. 
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Table 3.  Summary statistics: actual and potential migration rates, and measures of migration networks 
As percentage of the native population at origin in 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a country of origin-country of destination pair. The average and standard deviation are calculated including all observations 
without weighting them. The definition of the actual and potential migration rates is given in the text. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Net emigration rate 2000-2010, 
Less educated 
5654 0.05 0.28 
Net emigration rate 2000-2010,  
College educated 
4239 0.21 0.62 
Potential emigration rate 2000-2010,  
Less educated 
4239 0.49 1.67 
Potential emigration rate 2000-2010,  
College educated 
4100 0.71 1.72 
Stock of migrants relative to native population, 2000 5654 0.28 1.78 
Share of residents with at least one member of 
household abroad in the last 5 years, non-college  
educated 
3929 0.10 0.80 
Share of residents with at least one member of 
household abroad in the last 5 years , college educated 
3929 0.07 0.30 
56 
 
Table 4: Determinants of potential migration rates (p x 100) of non-college educated 
138 sending countries to our 30 destination countries, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the potential emigration rate from country of origin to country of destination, calculated as the sum of total 2000-2010 net migrants plus those 
that indicated willingness to migrate from origin to destination, divided by the population of natives in the country of origin as of 2000. Only individuals without college education 
are included. An observation is a country of origin-destination pair, for 138 origins and 30 (mainly OECD) destinations. All regressions include country of origin fixed effects and 
the size of the population at destination. The observations are weighted by the country of origin population without college education, and we drop migration rates smaller than 0 
and larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution. Standard errors are clustered by country of origin. ***,**,* imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Basic, non-
negative rates 
(2) 
All rates 
(3) 
Basic 
geography 
and culture 
(4) 
Extended 
geography  
and culture 
(5) 
Including 
contemporaneous 
growth rate 
(6) 
Policies  
(7) 
Only migrants 
from Asia-
Africa-Latin 
America 
Stock migrants/ 
population in 2000 
0.83*** 
(0.31) 
0.46 
(0.32) 
0.77** 
(0.31) 
0.73** 
(0.31) 
0.77** 
(0.31) 
0.77** 
(0.31) 
0.95* 
(0.52) 
Stock people with 
household member 
abroad/population 
0.91** 
(0.44) 
0.97** 
(0.45) 
0.89** 
(0.43) 
0.87** 
(0.42) 
0.89** 
(0.43) 
0.89** 
(0.43) 
0.83* 
(0.44) 
Real GDP per person 
(1,000 $ PPP), 
destination  in 2000 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.03) 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.02** 
(0.004) 
Empl/Pop 15+, 
destination in 2000 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Free labor movement 
dummy in 2000 
     0.046 
(0.124) 
 
Visa waiver dummy      -0.016 
(0.085) 
 
Growth of GDP per 
person 2000-2010 
    -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Standard controls Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Geographical and 
cultural controls 
None None ln(distance), 
border, 
common lang. 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang., colony, 
legal origin, 
currency, 
landlocked, 
religious prox., 
genetic distance 
ln(distance), 
border,  
common lang 
ln(distance), 
border, 
common lang 
ln(distance), 
border, 
common lang 
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Table 5: Determinants of potential migration rates (p x 100) of college educated 
138 sending countries to our 30 destination countries, 2000-2010 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the potential emigration rate from country of origin to country of destination, calculated as the sum of total 2000-2010 net migrants plus those 
that indicated willingness to migrate from origin to destination, divided by the population of natives in the country of origin as of 2000. Only individuals with college education are 
included. An observation is a country of origin-destination pair, for 138 origins and 30 (mainly OECD) destinations. All regressions include country of origin fixed effects and the 
size of the population at destination. The observations are weighted by the country of origin population with college education, and we drop migration rates smaller than 0 and 
larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution. Standard errors are clustered by country of origin. ***,**,* imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Basic, non-
negative rates 
(2) 
All rates 
(3) 
Basic 
geography 
and culture 
(4) 
Extended 
geography  
and culture 
(5) 
Including 
contemporaneous 
growth rate 
(6) 
Policies  
(7) 
Only migrants 
from Asia-
Africa-Latin 
America 
Stock migrants/ 
population in 2000 
1.03*** 
(0.33) 
0.94*** 
(0.30) 
0.98*** 
(0.27) 
0.80*** 
(0.25) 
0.99*** 
(0.27) 
0.964*** 
(0.27) 
1.90 
(1.23) 
Stock people with 
household member 
abroad /population 
2.17*** 
(0.35) 
2.17*** 
(0.35) 
2.01*** 
(0.32) 
2.01*** 
(0.32) 
2.01*** 
(0.32) 
1.9823*** 
(0.332) 
1.70*** 
(0.34) 
Real GDP per person 
(1,000 $ PPP), 
destination  in 2000 
0.03*** 
(0.002) 
0.03*** 
(0.002) 
0.03*** 
(0.003) 
0.03*** 
(0.002) 
0.03*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.004) 
0.03*** 
(0.006) 
Empl/Pop 15+, 
destination in 2000 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
0.01** 
(0.004) 
0.01** 
(0.04) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
Free labor movement 
dummy in 2000 
     0.207 
(0.155) 
 
Visa waiver dummy      0.112 
(0.078) 
 
Growth of GDP per 
person 2000-2010 
    -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Standard controls Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Geographical and 
cultural controls 
None None ln(distance), 
border, 
common lang. 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang., colony, 
legal origin, 
currency, 
landlocked, 
religious prox., 
genetic distance 
ln(distance), 
border,  
common lang 
ln(distance), 
border, 
common lang 
ln(distance), 
border,  
common lang 
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Table 6: Determinants of potential migration rates, Robustness Checks 
138 sending countries to our 30 destination countries, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  The specification estimated corresponds to column (5) in Tables 3 and 4. Columns (1)-(3) refer to non-college educated, columns (4)-(6) refer to 
college educated. In columns 1 and 4 we include also destination-continent dummies. In columns 2 and 5 we use only the measure of people willing to 
emigrate relative to the population in 2000 as dependent. In columns 3 and 6 we select those bilateral observations on willingness to migrate that included 
at least 75 or 37 surveyed people, respectively. The observations are weighted by the country of origin population with college education, and we drop 
migration rates smaller than 0 and larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution.  Standard errors are clustered by country of origin. ***,**,* imply 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
  
 Less educated College educated 
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Including 
destination 
continent 
dummies 
(2) 
Only willing to 
emigrate as 
dependent 
variable 
(3) 
Only most 
reliable data on 
willingness to 
emigrate 
(4) 
Including 
destination 
continent 
dummies 
(5) 
Only willing to 
emigrate as 
dependent 
variable 
(6) 
Only most reliable 
data on 
willingness to 
emigrate 
Stock 
migrants/population in 
2000 
0.72*** 
(0.29) 
0.69*** 
(0.28) 
0.71** 
(0.32) 
0.95*** 
(0.24) 
0.62*** 
(0.14) 
0.73*** 
(0.22) 
Stock people with 
family 
abroad/population 
0.86** 
(0.41) 
0.83** 
(0.41) 
1.20* 
(0.63) 
1.70*** 
(0.30) 
1.50*** 
(0.26) 
2.87*** 
(0.47) 
Real GDP per person 
(1,000 $ PPP), 
destination  in 2000 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.003) 
0.03*** 
(0.002) 
0.03*** 
(0.002) 
0.03*** 
(0.003) 
Empl/Pop 15+, 
destination in 2000 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
Growth of GDP per 
person 2000-2010 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0007 
(0.0007) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Standard controls Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Origin FE, 
ln(Popd)  
Geographical and 
cultural controls 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang. 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang. 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang. 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang. 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang. 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang. 
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Table 7: Determinants of net migration rates (m x100) of the less educated 
138 sending countries to our 30 destination countries, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the emigration rate from country of origin to country of destination, calculated as the sum of total 2000-2010 net migrants, divided by 
the population of natives in the country of origin as of 2000. Only individuals without college education are included. An observation is a country of origin-destination 
pair, for 138 origins and 30 (mainly OECD) destinations. All regressions include country of origin fixed effects. The observations are weighted by the country of origin 
population without college education, and we drop migration rates larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution.  Standard errors are clustered by country of 
origin,.***,**,* imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Basic 
(2) 
Control for 
levels 
(3) 
Include 
network 
(4) 
Add Free labor 
mobility 2000 
and visa waiver 
(5) 
Free labor, 
geography and 
culture 
(6) 
As (4) using 
desire to migrate 
permanently 
Potential Emigration 
rates, Low Skilled 
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.038*** 
(0.0009) 
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.047*** 
(0.0102) 
0.058** 
(0.012) 
GDP growth, destination  
2000-2010 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
(Empl/Pop 15+) growth,  
destination 2000-2010 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Stock people with family 
abroad/population 
  0.036** 
(0.017) 
   
Free labor movement 
dummy  
   0.0106** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0114* 
(0.0060) 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
Visa waiver dummy    0.0108** 
(0.0047) 
0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Real GDP per person 
(1,000 $ PPP), 
destination  in 2000 
 -0.00004 
(0.00007) 
    
Employment/Population 
working age destination 
in 2000 
 -0.0002 
(0.0002) 
    
Standard controls Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE 
Geographical and 
cultural controls 
None None None None ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang., colony,  
legal origin, 
currency, 
landlocked, 
religious prox., 
genetic distance 
None 
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Table 8: Determinants of net migration rates (m x 100) of college educated 
All sending countries to our 30 destination countries, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the emigration rate from country of origin to country of destination, calculated as the sum of total 2000-2010 net migrants, divided 
by the population of natives in the country of origin as of 2000. Only individuals with college education are included. An observation is a country of origin-destination 
pair, for 138 origins and 30 (mainly OECD) destinations. All regressions include country of origin fixed effects. The observations are weighted by the country of 
origin population with college education, and we drop migration rates larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution.  Standard errors are clustered by country of 
origin..***,**,* imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Basic 
(2) 
Control for 
levels 
(3) 
Include 
network 
(4) 
Add Free labor 
mobility 2000 
and visa waiver 
(5) 
Free labor, 
geography and 
culture 
(6) 
As (4) using 
desire to migrate 
permanently 
Potential Emigration 
rates, High Skilled 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
GDP growth, destination  
2000-2010 
0.0008*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
(Empl/Pop 15+) growth,  
destination 2000-2010 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.0015) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0024* 
(0.001) 
-0.0027** 
(0.0012) 
Stock people with family 
abroad/population 
  0.06 
(0.11) 
   
Free labor movement 
dummy  
   0.0056 
(0.0145) 
0.0235 
(0.0216) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
Visa waiver dummy    -0.0338 
(0.0208) 
-0.0351 
(0.0236) 
-0.04 
(0.024) 
Real GDP per person 
(1,000 $ PPP), 
destination  in 2000 
 0.0001 
(0.0002) 
    
Employment/Population 
working age destination 
in 2000 
 -0.0006 
(0.0006) 
    
Standard controls Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE 
Geographical and 
cultural controls 
None None None None ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang., colony,  
legal origin, 
currency, 
landlocked, 
religious prox., 
genetic distance 
None 
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Table 9: Same matching function for college educated and the less educated 
Change in immigration flows and rates in the destination countries 
 
 
Net inflow 2000-2010  
Less educated 
Net immigration rate 2000-2010 
Less educated 
Net immigration rate 2000-2010 
Total 
Observed Counterfactual Change Observed Counterfactual Observed Counterfactual 
Australia -43,572 156,502 200,074 -0.6 2.2 6.5 8.7 
Austria 131,191 245,474 114,283 3.1 5.7 4.0 6.4 
Belgium 98,126 190,134 92,008 2.0 4.0 4.4 5.8 
Canada -106,830 203,246 310,076 -0.8 1.6 11.9 13.9 
Chile 1,134,916 1,208,874 73,958 16.7 17.8 17.5 18.4 
Denmark 84,565 117,438 32,873 2.9 4.0 3.9 4.8 
Finland 71,786 97,746 25,960 2.4 3.3 2.8 3.6 
France 531,354 1,423,387 892,033 1.8 4.7 2.7 5.2 
Germany 343,256 878,725 535,469 0.8 2.0 0.8 1.7 
Greece 437,392 532,983 95,591 7.1 8.6 9.5 10.8 
Ireland 97,686 178,475 80,789 6.1 11.2 11.7 15.6 
Israel -205,390 -200,132 5,258 -18.7 -18.2 -10.6 -10.3 
Italy 474,837 1,164,453 689,616 1.3 3.1 1.9 3.5 
Japan 139,541 618,870 479,329 0.2 1.0 0.4 0.9 
Luxembourg 18,538 26,751 8,213 10.5 15.2 12.3 16.4 
Mexico 49,710 145,167 95,457 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 
Netherlands -310,625 -168,669 141,956 -4.3 -2.3 -3.5 -2.0 
New Zealand 100,327 213,531 113,204 9.1 19.4 8.9 14.9 
Norway 114,426 210,155 95,729 5.2 9.6 7.3 10.6 
Poland -189,459 -187,202 2,257 -0.9 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 
Portugal 424,044 540,023 115,979 6.7 8.6 8.2 9.8 
Russian Federation -1,117,531 -1,049,495 68,036 -2.7 -2.6 -0.7 -0.6 
Saudi Arabia 997,625 2,294,148 1,296,523 20.4 46.8 31.1 54.8 
South Africa 505,528 740,170 234,642 2.8 4.1 4.2 5.3 
Spain 2,328,310 3,588,335 1,260,025 10.6 16.3 12.3 17.0 
Sweden 198,125 307,922 109,797 4.7 7.3 7.1 9.1 
Switzerland 94,586 292,052 197,466 3.0 9.1 3.1 8.1 
United Arab Emirates 1,269,853 1,700,601 430,748 248.4 332.6 303.9 374.3 
United Kingdom 275,684 1,457,422 1,181,738 0.9 4.6 4.1 7.3 
United States 4,629,616 10,387,622 5,758,006 6.3 14.0 5.0 8.6 
Total/Average 12,577,615 27,314,708 14,737,093 17.0 36.9 16.1 25.3 
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Table 10: Effects of interactions opportunity-potential on migration rates (m x 100) 
All sending countries to our 30 destination countries, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the emigration rate from country of origin to country of destination, calculated as the sum of total 2000-2010 net 
migrants, divided by the population of natives in the country of origin as of 2000. Only individuals without college education are included in regressions 1-
3, while only individual with college education are included in 4-6. An observation is a country of origin-destination pair, for 138 origins and 30 (mainly 
OECD) destinations. All regressions include country of origin fixed effects. The observations are weighted by the country of origin population in the 
relevant education group, and we drop migration rates larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution.  Standard errors are clustered by country of origin. 
***,**,* imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
  
 Less educated College educated 
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Potential-
growth 
(2) 
Potential-
policy 
(3) 
Potential-
network 
(4) 
Potential-
growth 
(5) 
Potential- 
policy 
(6) 
Potential-
network 
Potential Emigration rates 0.04*** 
(0.015) 
0.0464** 
(0.0229) 
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.3080*** 
(0.1115) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
GDP growth, destination  
2000-2010 
0.00018 
(0.00013) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
(Empl/Pop 15+) growth,  
destination 2000-2010 
0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0022* 
(0.0012) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Stock people with family 
abroad/population 
  0.015 
(0.051) 
  0.08 
(0.07) 
Free labor movement 
dummy  
 0.0038 
(0.0061) 
  -0.0348 
(0.0372) 
 
Visa waiver dummy  0.0110** 
(0.0045) 
  -0.0019 
(0.0233) 
 
Interaction 
(Potential) x (GDP growth) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
  0.017 
(0.016) 
  
Interaction 
(Potential) x (free) 
 0.0145 
(0.0151) 
  0.0597 
(0.0447) 
 
Interaction 
(Potential) x (visa waiver) 
 -0.0003 
(0.0078) 
  -0.0716* 
(0.0404) 
 
Interaction 
(Potential) x (network) 
  0.004 
(0.013) 
  -0.01 
(0.07) 
Controls Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE 
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Table 11: Do poor sending countries have a different effect on migration rates? (m x 100) 
Sending countries in Asia, Latin America and Asia to our 30 destination countries, 2000-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the emigration rate from country of origin to country of destination, calculated as the sum of total 2000-2010 net 
migrants, divided by the population of natives in the country of origin as of 2000. Only individuals without college education are included in regressions 1-
3, while only individual with college education are included in 4-6. An observation is a country of origin-destination pair, for Asian, African and Latina 
American countries of origin and 30 (mainly OECD) destinations. All regressions include country of origin fixed effects. The observations are weighted by 
the country of origin population in the relevant education group, and we drop migration rates larger than the 99th percentile of the distribution.  Standard 
errors are clustered by country of origin. ***,**,* imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 Less educated College educated 
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Basic with geo 
controls 
(2) 
Control for 
income 
levels 
(3) 
With 
potential-
growth 
interaction 
(4) 
Basic with geo 
controls 
(5) 
Control for 
income levels 
(6) 
With 
potential-
growth 
interaction 
Potential Emigration rates 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.22*** 
(0.04) 
0.17*** 
(0.03) 
GDP growth, destination  
2000-2010 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
(Empl/Pop 15+) growth,  
destination 2000-2010 
0.001** 
(0.0005) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.001* 
(0.0005) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
Real GDP per person (1,000 
$ PPP), destination  in 2000 
 -0.00002 
(0.00008) 
  0.0009 
(0.0005) 
 
Empl/Pop 15+, destination in 
2000 
 0.00007 
(0.0001) 
  -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Visa Waiver Dummy  0.014* 
(0.007) 
  -0.059** 
(0.024) 
 
Interaction 
(Potential) x (GDP growth) 
  0.03** 
(0.014) 
  0.03 
(0.03) 
Standard controls Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE Origin FE 
Geographical and cultural 
controls 
ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang., colony,  
legal origin, 
currency, 
landlocked, 
religious prox., 
genetic distance 
None None ln(distance), 
border, common 
lang., colony,  
legal origin, 
currency, 
landlocked, 
religious prox., 
genetic distance 
None None 
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Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics for explanatory variables and controls 
 Observations Mean Standard dev. Min Max 
Real GDP per person, in 2000 PPP $, destination 5363 27606.65 11633.00 5893.64 62626.35 
Real GDP per person, in 2000 PPP $, origin 5363 10392.59 12829.56 117.22 74162.94 
(Empl/Pop 15 years and older)x100, destination  5115 53.72 7.32 38.70 74.40 
(Empl/Pop 15 years and older)x100, origin 5115 57.43 11.03 35.40 85.50 
Distance in KM 5456 7353.83 4437.13 114.63 19539.47 
Border Dummy 5456 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Dummy for common language 5456 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Dummy for shared colonial past 5456 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Dummy for common legal origin 5456 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Dummy for common currency 5456 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Sum of landlocked dummies 5394 0.35 0.53 0.00 2.00 
Measure of Religious proximity 5673 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.98 
Genetic distance (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2010) 5672 912.53 647.90 0.00 3115.87 
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Table A2 
Correlation between potential and actual migrants: aggregate regressions across countries of origin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the emigration rate from country of origin, calculated as the sum of total 2000-2010 net migrants, divided by the 
population of natives in the country of origin as of 2000. Each observation is one of 138 countries of origin. The observations are weighted by the country 
of origin population with college education, and we drop migration rates.  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.***,**,* imply significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 College Educated Non College Educated 
Explanatory Variable: (1) 
Basic 
(2) 
Including controls 
(3) 
Basic 
(4) 
Including controls 
Potential Emigration rates 0.45*** 
(0.09) 
0.18* 
(0.11) 
0.054** 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.026) 
Stock of people with household 
members abroad/population 
 1.31*** 
(0.29) 
 0.16 
(0.10) 
Real GDP per person in origin (1,000 
$ PPP) 
 -0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
 -0.0001 
(0.00008) 
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Table A3: Actual and desired immigration rates of college educated and the less educated by origin country 
Destination Net rates  2000-2010 
Less educated 
Net rates 2000-2010 
College educated 
Desired rates 
Less educated 
Desired rates 
 College educated 
Population  
Ratio of College 
educated  
to Less educated 
Afghanistan 0.378 6.177 10.992 19.133 0.080 
Albania 9.800 66.976 31.793 37.139 0.077 
Algeria 0.869 14.494 14.581 11.298 0.057 
Argentina 1.011 5.362 10.009 16.731 0.129 
Armenia 1.068 23.480 22.542 27.471 0.250 
Australia 0.354 4.507 9.368 13.170 0.264 
Austria -1.683 -1.435 7.172 13.164 0.129 
Azerbaijan -2.652 9.143 9.429 11.751 0.128 
Bahrain 0.273 25.890 1.624 1.286 0.039 
Bangladesh 0.625 9.568 19.274 39.107 0.043 
Belarus -4.283 3.939 10.854 19.675 0.267 
Belgium 0.563 2.863 10.592 14.828 0.313 
Belize 2.682 112.886 20.548 23.120 0.082 
Bolivia 3.819 12.268 12.754 16.509 0.161 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -8.676 30.384 8.992 12.029 0.074 
Botswana 1.911 18.839 13.689 26.923 0.041 
Brazil 0.266 2.692 11.186 16.786 0.078 
Bulgaria 2.344 9.667 9.399 17.075 0.222 
Burundi 0.259 55.932 6.835 100.000 0.006 
Cambodia 0.692 93.310 22.932 35.913 0.006 
Cameroon 0.535 50.278 23.027 26.316 0.012 
Canada -0.110 4.879 10.531 14.435 0.215 
Chad 0.086 6.766 7.625 9.536 0.013 
Chile 0.564 2.641 15.608 22.114 0.265 
China 0.058 2.132 3.986 16.260 0.044 
Colombia 1.259 11.135 25.792 27.996 0.118 
Comoros 4.424 62.206 23.615 27.083 0.014 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.200 17.908 21.740 32.340 0.013 
Costa Rica 0.981 4.720 14.774 12.217 0.198 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.183 5.692 18.648 31.635 0.114 
Croatia -13.400 15.867 5.505 3.586 0.049 
Cyprus 1.019 16.455 8.017 20.576 0.308 
Czech Republic 0.223 3.481 6.125 10.748 0.112 
Denmark 0.044 5.510 10.245 17.892 0.202 
67 
 
Djibouti 0.163 9.730 15.035 25.041 0.023 
Dominican Republic 5.648 28.502 47.102 41.319 0.141 
Ecuador 5.656 18.771 17.558 21.474 0.173 
Egypt 0.757 17.673 8.988 11.011 0.046 
El Salvador 16.468 52.111 30.475 43.006 0.102 
Estonia 9.479 34.634 16.532 15.811 0.374 
Finland -0.912 4.077 12.253 17.788 0.158 
France 0.391 3.402 10.026 21.906 0.207 
Georgia -4.758 4.129 13.510 17.428 0.128 
Germany 0.247 1.977 17.467 19.090 0.244 
Ghana 0.391 21.397 38.529 38.106 0.044 
Greece -3.072 2.909 8.294 18.251 0.177 
Guatemala 6.856 56.715 21.976 25.288 0.036 
Guinea 0.733 16.814 25.030 40.866 0.022 
Haiti 3.262 413.808 30.746 46.658 0.009 
Honduras 8.275 64.760 27.495 32.201 0.041 
Hong Kong 0.048 31.626 12.892 26.892 0.163 
Hungary -0.238 4.948 13.174 12.595 0.143 
Iceland 3.630 26.855 17.259 20.385 0.183 
India 0.202 6.138 2.151 10.789 0.051 
Indonesia 0.034 2.520 2.714 8.042 0.028 
Iran 0.001 6.424 15.280 34.391 0.100 
Iraq 0.745 11.618 5.714 10.998 0.099 
Ireland 2.048 25.211 11.822 18.579 0.298 
Israel 0.977 6.125 11.773 19.336 0.622 
Italy -1.128 4.189 11.418 29.441 0.103 
Japan -0.032 0.113 9.924 16.476 0.400 
Jordan 5.707 26.634 15.854 21.073 0.168 
Kazakhstan -2.768 18.240 9.080 10.397 0.147 
Kenya 0.241 34.199 22.248 34.018 0.023 
Korea, Rep. 0.220 4.794 17.631 29.832 0.367 
Kuwait 4.772 365.757 3.155 3.810 0.015 
Kyrgyz Republic 2.167 18.820 11.721 17.599 0.181 
Laos 0.989 39.954 5.569 5.214 0.043 
Latvia -0.148 13.470 15.229 17.260 0.153 
Lebanon 2.567 106.875 17.914 20.382 0.051 
Liberia 0.566 72.704 36.635 50.322 0.025 
Libya -0.031 20.362 14.197 13.045 0.024 
Lithuania -0.416 10.454 14.590 19.149 0.184 
Luxembourg 1.973 10.770 14.294 23.526 0.159 
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Macedonia -1.651 2.225 20.411 23.354 0.077 
Malawi 0.574 58.055 25.671 22.212 0.005 
Malaysia 0.072 7.300 3.694 13.611 0.094 
Mali 0.793 30.780 12.955 33.952 0.007 
Malta -0.073 82.980 15.248 32.181 0.066 
Mauritania 0.912 24.469 14.241 18.200 0.017 
Mexico 8.082 13.677 14.990 21.899 0.134 
Moldova 0.284 19.020 23.324 26.176 0.101 
Mongolia -0.253 2.819 11.524 24.488 0.138 
Morocco 2.845 30.630 13.345 14.496 0.080 
Namibia 4.218 147.195 9.838 0.000 0.023 
Nepal 0.130 7.705 9.658 30.391 0.038 
Netherlands 0.366 5.904 13.125 17.603 0.292 
New Zealand 1.208 10.634 18.953 18.219 0.740 
Nicaragua 3.130 20.994 21.204 29.015 0.143 
Niger 0.022 4.017 4.457 24.315 0.008 
Nigeria 0.086 13.993 38.182 45.891 0.022 
Norway 0.102 2.834 10.681 18.430 0.304 
Pakistan 1.263 12.676 7.844 19.147 0.076 
Palestinian Territory 24.910 462.255 8.352 14.915 0.039 
Panama 0.120 -0.456 12.473 18.372 0.261 
Paraguay 2.539 14.275 5.643 16.226 0.074 
Peru 2.066 6.774 27.216 26.472 0.266 
Philippines 1.263 8.927 17.689 36.457 0.338 
Poland 0.555 8.927 8.761 10.529 0.143 
Portugal 0.459 14.386 8.222 18.336 0.108 
Qatar 0.344 7.166 3.943 3.664 0.130 
Romania 3.559 21.593 17.650 25.497 0.100 
Russian Federation 0.105 0.196 6.168 12.775 1.146 
Saudi Arabia 0.102 2.845 1.677 1.138 0.119 
Senegal 1.451 42.790 31.836 50.986 0.024 
Serbia and Montenegro 6.023 10.734 15.799 14.764 0.150 
Sierra Leone 0.604 159.058 36.755 58.638 0.008 
Singapore 0.242 17.872 5.143 9.596 0.088 
Slovakia -3.928 5.773 13.226 22.771 0.131 
Slovenia -2.241 0.424 11.271 13.831 0.192 
Somalia 2.013 68.930 21.398 24.950 0.015 
South Africa 0.141 6.880 8.557 12.060 0.094 
Spain -0.622 1.020 6.926 15.131 0.223 
Sri Lanka 0.265 6.927 9.796 17.767 0.159 
69 
 
Sudan 0.476 42.557 15.457 30.189 0.010 
Sweden 0.590 3.088 14.710 14.997 0.286 
Switzerland 0.501 5.725 8.036 3.627 0.221 
Syria 1.235 21.870 16.570 20.079 0.048 
Taiwan 0.054 4.110 11.572 21.201 0.255 
Tajikistan 0.768 24.293 10.230 15.363 0.074 
Tanzania 0.055 23.923 14.821 48.836 0.009 
Thailand 0.237 3.912 3.024 4.772 0.057 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.520 280.268 14.799 21.332 0.036 
Tunisia 0.041 12.257 15.095 21.749 0.058 
Turkey -1.532 4.039 8.785 14.523 0.100 
Turkmenistan -0.213 4.151 5.913 13.173 0.182 
Ukraine -3.318 2.398 11.449 17.524 0.611 
United Arab Emirates 5.127 13.111 1.047 3.816 0.196 
United Kingdom 0.500 13.984 21.765 27.524 0.147 
United States 0.202 0.322 8.223 11.708 1.149 
Uruguay 2.447 12.497 9.220 10.507 0.122 
Uzbekistan 0.817 11.082 6.428 8.857 0.125 
Venezuela 0.536 4.595 6.729 12.209 0.170 
Vietnam 0.673 32.555 7.173 15.427 0.024 
Yemen 1.514 103.992 16.277 29.681 0.012 
Zambia 0.477 37.382 15.698 22.855 0.021 
Zimbabwe 2.255 203.604 24.296 33.774 0.010 
Average 1.149 33.341 14.221 21.437 0.145 
 
Note: The net migration rate is constructed as described in the text, namely as net emigration 2000-2010 divided by the population of natives in the country of 
origin as of 2000, and then multiplying this fraction by 100. Countries with negative rates have a net inflow of their nationals (return), countries with net rates 
larger than 100% (only for college educated) may have some of their expatriates obtain a degree abroad. 
